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Realism about mental disorders is a perennial area of dispute, but the 
controversy burns especially intensely for Attention Deficit Hyperactivity 
Disorder (ADHD). In this dissertation, I clarify what is at issue in these debates, 
surveying how realists have typically argued for mental disorder realism: the 
definitional debate about health and illness. I argue that the realist need not be 
committed to the terms of the definitional debate and recommend that a better 
approach is to show that mental disorders are natural kinds. While there are many 
accounts of kind-hood on offer, I adopt Richard Boyd’s homeostatic property 
cluster (HPC) theory of kinds, which I interpret through the philosophy of 
neuroscience literature on mechanisms. In sum, I conclude that if ADHD is a 
natural kind – and thus real – then individuals diagnosed with the disorder should 
be sufficiently similar with respect to an underlying cognitive neurobiological 
mechanism. To determine whether ADHD individuals are similar in this way, I 
consider the question through Russell Barkley’s Executive Function Model of 
ADHD. Relying primarily on the cognitive neurobiological research, I argue that 
there is now reasonable evidence to conclude that the DSM classification of 









According to the predominant medical understanding of the 
condition, ADHD is a neurodevelopmental disorder affecting between 5- 
11% of children and 8% of adults in the United States, and between 2.5- 
5% of children and 1.2–7.3% of adults worldwide (Hinshaw and Scheffler 
2014 and Faraone et al. 2015). Beyond this, much is contested about 
ADHD. Some of these controversies (e.g. vague diagnostic boundaries, 
high co-morbidity) aren’t unique to ADHD, but could very well apply to 
any condition in the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental 
Disorders (DSM). But if we had to select a thematic core in the 
controversies about ADHD, it would most certainly include the following 
items: a) it is one the most common medical conditions in children, b) by 
far, males compose the majority of ADHD diagnoses, c) teachers are 
frequently involved in initiating, and therefore steering, families towards 
seeking medical treatment, d) stimulant medication, which under certain 
conditions exerts similar psychoactive effects as cocaine, is often 
prescribed to curb ADHD type behaviors, and e) the high rate of 
prevalence in the United States. While all of these are involve important 




concerned with what I believe to be the fundamental question: whether 
ADHD is real. 
Doubts the reality of ADHD have persisted ever since the public at 
large became aware of the disorder. While we cannot say this about many 
other mental disorders (e.g. depression, schizophrenia), for ADHD we can 
date precisely when that occurred: June 29
th
, 1970. On that day, the 
Washington Post reported on an academic enhancement program called 
“STAR”, which was supposedly implemented by the Omaha public school 
system. In addition to providing tutoring and other types of educational 
assistance, the story claimed that school administrators were coercing 
parents into dosing their children with “behavior drugs”, including Ritalin 
and Dexedrine. Robert Maynard, who penned the story, estimated that “5- 
10%” of the district’s 62,000 students were taking psychoactive 
medication (Ross and Ross 1976, 20). The Post story created such a public 
outcry, that the House Committee on Government Operations convened a 
public hearing to investigate whether the federal government had any role 
in dispensing behavior modification drugs to public schools. The 
committee’s investigation discovered a number of inaccuracies in 
Maynard’s story, but that came too late to stop the feeding frenzy in the 




In the aftermath of the Post story, Americans learned about a 
condition called “minimal brain dysfunction” (MBD), which pediatricians 
had been diagnosing since the 1940’s. MBD was presumably biological in 
origin, and its symptoms included excessive motility, inattention, and 
impulsiveness. Questions about this “new” disorder immediately arose. In 
an August 1970 letter to the New York Review of Books, for instance, 
educational reformer John Holt argued that MBD was no more than, 
“…currently fashionable quackery, which blames on the nervous systems 
of children the stupidities and inhumanities of our schools…” (Holt 1970). 
Five years after Holt’s letter, the journalists Peter Schrag and Diane 
Divoky published the first book length critique of hyperactivity The Myth 
of the Hyperactive Child and Other Means of Child Control (1975). 
Schrag and Divoky decried what they characterized as the growing 
“therapeutic state”, a network of mental health and educational 
professionals seeking to exercise ever more control over children’s 
behavior by “making up” new medical disorders. That same year, 
sociologist published The Discovery of Hyperkinesis: Notes on the 
Medicalization of Deviance (1975). Although more measured than Holt, 
Schrag and Divoky, Conrad nevertheless implied that hyperkinesis 
reflected not a property internal to a child, but rather was product of the 




might see the child's behavior as symptomatic of some ‘disorder’ in the 
school or classroom situation, rather than symptomatic of an individual 
neurological disorder,” (Conrad 1975, 20). 
During the 1990’s, at the height of the “Ritalin wars”, these and 
other claims about the dubious “reality” of ADHD were repeated ad 
nauseum. Thomas Armstrong inflammatorily compared ADHD to 
drapetomania, a 19
th 
century medical diagnosis “discovered” by southern 
physician Samuel Cartwright. Drapetomania referred to the “irrational” 
tendencies found among some slaves to run away from their owners 
(Armstrong 1995). Several conservative intellectuals argued that ADHD 
was the product of a feminist conspiracy to “androgenize” young boys 
(Will 1999, Fukuyama 2001) and suppress their natural exuberance 
(Sowell 2001). In The Hyperactivity Hoax Sydney Walker blamed the rise 
of new ADHD diagnosis on the parents’ unwillingness to properly 
discipline their children (Mayes et al. 2009). Fred Baughman’s The ADHD 
Fraud argued that greedy pharmaceutical companies had concocted 
ADHD in order to sell medications and the disorder lacked any consistent 
biological or neurological basis (Baughman and Hovey 2006). These 
debates continue into the 21
st 
century, and show no sign of stopping. In 
2003, for example, UK psychiatrist Sami Timimi claimed that since there 




medical tests for ADHD,” the disorder was best understood as a “cultural 
construct” (Timimi 2004, 8-9). As recently as 2013, neurologist Richard 
Saul published a volume unsubtly titled ADHD Does Not Exist (2013). 
Despite this long-standing controversy, philosophers - both within 
the philosophy of psychiatry and in other relevant fields – have remained 
largely silent about ADHD and broader questions concerning its “reality.” 
When I started research for this dissertation in the summer of 2013, there 
was no philosophical literature about this issue to consult. Since then two 
works have appeared that are worth mentioning at the outset. I will discuss 
these briefly and then go on to outline the scope and aims of this project. 
The first is Susan Hawthorne’s monograph Accidental Intolerance 
(2014), which is study about how ADHD is understood across different 
institutional contexts – clinical, research, educational – and the ways in 
which the values embedded in those contexts lead to the unintentional 
stigmatization of individuals with the disorder. These are important issues 
and Hawthorne’s treatment of them is excellent. But my interest in ADHD 
is different from hers. Save for the naturalist-normativist debate in the 
philosophy of medicine in chapter 2, I do not have much to say about 
ADHD’s ethical implications, whatever they might be. 
More relevant is the brief discussion in Muhammad Ali Khalidi’s 
 




cover similar ground, although our purposes are different. Khalidi’s 
overall aim is to provide general theory of natural kinds. His book makes 
use of several case studies (e.g. lithium, polymers, cancer) in order to 
clarify particular aspects of his theory. While he does conclude that, 
“…there is at least some evidence to suggest that [ADHD] is a psychiatric 
natural kind” (2013, 199) the primary purpose of his discussion of ADHD 
is to show, “…that the standards and principles for identifying natural 
kinds in a social science like psychiatry are similar in their general 
features to those deployed in the other sciences that have been examined,” 
(199). 
My discussion of ADHD in chapter 4 is a detailed study of the 
ADHD research, particularly from a cognitive neurobiological 
perspective. I argue that, given the present state of the field, there is 
sufficient evidence to indicate that ADHD is a natural kind, or more 
precisely several natural kinds lumped together by the DSM. So, qua 
natural kinds, Khalidi’s aims are much wider than my own; but qua 
ADHD, my aims are much more specific and detailed than Khalidi’s 




1.2: Overview of Chapter 2 
 
As we observed, many controversies surrounding ADHD concern 
its “reality.” This is a perennial problem for all mental disorders. I begin 
chapter 2 to by clarifying what is meant by the assertion that this or that 
condition is (or is not) “real.” A standard way to parse that claim is in 
terms of mind-independence. But without further clarification, simple 
mind-independence poses a special problem for distinctively mental 
phenomena. I argue that George Graham’s notion of “act-of- 
classification” (AC) independence is the relevant sense behind the 
realism-irrealism debate. I then proceed to outline the standard way in 
which philosophers have pursued realism about mental disorders, which I 
call the definitional debate about disease. 
The definitional debate concerns whether our disorder judgments 
are value-laden or “objective.” The standard realist position in the 
definitional debate is that both mental and physical disorders involve a 
dysfunction and that dysfunction is an entirely theoretical (i.e. value-free) 
notion. Therefore, whether mental disorder realism can be defended within 
the terms of the definitional debate depends on whether there is a value- 
free analysis of function-dysfunction to be had. I will show that the reason 
mental disorder realism’s fortunes are yoked to the definitional debate is 




1970’s that threatened to undermine institutional psychiatry’s legitimacy 
as a medical discipline: the anti-psychiatry movement and the gay 
liberation movement. The American Psychiatric Association (APA) tried 
to resolve both of these crises by formulating a general definition of 
disorder. This, in turn, influenced the debate within the philosophy of 
medicine. I then proceed to outline three main positions in the definitional 
debate: simple naturalism, two-stage views, and simple normativism. 
Along the way, I will show how various participants in this debate largely 
assume that AC-independence is the relevant criteria for determining 
whether a given mental disorder is “real.” I conclude chapter 2 by arguing 
that nothing in AC-independence requires us to conceive of disorders in 
terms of function-dysfunction, and so whether or not those concepts can 
be given a value-free analysis is orthogonal to the larger realist enterprise. 
If sound, that argument frees us up to pursue other approaches, which I 
proceed to do in chapter 3. 
1.3: Overview of Chapter 3 
 
Another way to meet AC-independence for mental disorders is to 
argue that they (or some subset thereof) are natural kinds. Other than 
citing paradigmatic examples of natural kinds – e.g. gold, tigers, humans, 
and electrons – it is difficult to specify what else natural kinds are like 




issues, including those involving meaning and reference, explanation, 
induction, the purpose of science, the nature of laws, the fundamental 
ontological structure of the universe, and much else besides. As Paul 
Churchland correctly observes, “…different writers confront a different 
‘problem of natural kinds’ depending on which background issue is for 
them the principal issue at stake,” (1992, 281). 
So to get clear on the notion of natural kinds, I begin with 
essentialism, which is the traditional framework in which philosophers 
have understood natural kinds. Originating in Aristotle’s work, the two 
core tenants of essentialism say that natural kinds are a) classes of 
individuals united by a shared set of properties, or essences and b) 
essences are necessary and sufficient for membership to the kind. In the 
modern era, philosophers have imposed several further conditions about 
what a kinds essences are supposed to be like.
1 
I will consider two. One 
 
says that kind-essences are identical to its microstructural properties; 
another says that a kind’s essential properties are intrinsic. 
I argue that essentialism is not a suitable theory of natural kinds. 
 
Before recapitulating argument here, I say something about the 





This is not intended to suggest there is consensus among 




of natural kinds from broadly naturalistic perspective, which is not so 
much a commitment to a core doctrine, but rather a particular method for 
evaluating philosophical accounts of kind-hood. Khalidi provides a 
particularly clear statement of this method (2013). 
Khalidi argues that a theory of natural kinds should aim towards a 
sort of reflective equilibrium between our scientific and philosophical 
commitments. This suggests a set of defeasible constraints assessing 
whether a particular theory of natural kinds is adequate. First, on balance, 
philosophical accounts of kind-hood that admit scientific categories we 
paradigmatically count as natural kinds are more adequate than those that 
do not. Second, philosophical accounts of kind-hood that take on board, as 
much as possible, traditional philosophical claims made on behalf of kind- 
hood are preferable to accounts that do not. There will inevitably be 
instances when these two constraints pull in different directions, but 
reflective equilibrium recommends that in such cases, we revise our prior 
scientific and philosophical beliefs until we can reconcile our 
commitments about kinds (Khalidi 2013, 3-4). 
Now, there is always a danger that in articulating such a criteria for 
assessing different theories, one inadvertently begs some important 
question against their opponents. Perhaps one might say that philosophy is 




any scientific constraints about what is acceptable philosophical doctrine. 
So, perhaps there are limits in how inclusive the approach outlined above 
really is. I would just add that with respect to essentialism, the method of 
reflective equilibrium is not obviously question begging. 
Consider that every single one of the classic examples of 
essentialist kinds – lemons (Putnam 1975, 158-159), tigers (Kripke 1980, 
120-121), gold (1980, 123-125) and water (1980, 128) – are components 
of actual scientific taxonomies in biology and chemistry. Arguably, 
essentialism provides a metaphysical account of, say, why members of 
these kinds resemble one another in certain respects. Namely, kinds have a 
set of essential properties that reliably lead to the co-instantiation of other 
properties, which is why members of the same kind are similar. Thus, we 
can presumably discover what these essences are and how they sustain 
these systematic resemblances among its members. But since any item in 
a scientific taxonomy is not immune to further revision, it is also true that 
our beliefs about it could turn out to be wrong. If a philosophical theory of 
kinds purports to make sense of actual scientific cases, then perhaps that 
view would similarly require revision, should new facts about the 





A standard critique of essentialism is that many scientific 
categories we think of as kinds, such as species, do not meet its demands. 
This is true, but so stated that critique implies that essentialism leaves us 
with an impoverished ontology. Many versions of essentialism are actually 
essentialism plus microstructuralism. For individual species (e.g. homo 
sapiens) essentialism plus microstructuralism rules all of those categories 
out, but further implies that each individual member – or, what we thought 
of as an individual member (e.g. Jim, Martin, Steve) – are actually natural 
kinds in their own right. This suffices to make essentialism about kinds a 
non-starter, since it is radically at odds with how science presently carves 
up the world. I also consider some more specific critiques such as the 
notion that a kind’s essential properties must be intrinsic. For one version 
of essentialism – Brian Ellis’s “scientific essentialism” – his account of 
intrinsicality actually undermines his flagship example of essentialist kind: 
chemical kinds. But the larger problem for that thesis is that simply too 
many scientific categories are individuated by properties that no account  
of intrinsic property would satisfy. 
I then present a better view of natural kinds, Richard Boyd’s 
homeostatic property cluster (HPC) theory. Boyd explicitly identifies his 
account as a competitor to essentialism, “The natural kinds that have 




conditions…are an unrepresentative minority of natural kinds (perhaps 
even a minority of zero),” (Boyd 1999, 169). An HPC is cluster of 
contingently associated properties that tend to be reliably co-instantiated 
by its members, or instances, due to a causal mechanism (or network of 
causal mechanisms). The property clustering is often imperfect, so unlike 
essentialism, the HPC-theory to declines to identify any single subset as 
necessary and sufficient for membership. However, HPC kinds are still fit 
for scientific investigation and can support causal generalizations, since 
the presence of the mechanism tends to keep the cluster in a relative state 
of homeostasis. It is not clear whether the HPC-theory works as a 
“general” theory of kind-hood, but it is widely agreed that it 
accommodates several actual categories in the “special sciences”, which 
suffices for our purposes. 
Boyd provides a lot of interpretive leeway in understanding how an 
HPC-kind is “put together” and which properties count in establishing the 
identity of a given HPC. I thus further clarify the sense in which ADHD is, 
or might be, an HPC by consulting cognitive neurobiology. Roughly, this 
view holds that complex cognitive capacities – such as those likely 
involved in the production of mental disorders – are implemented by 
mechanisms, defined as an organized hierarchical physical system 




HPC-kind if its symptoms result from, or are sustained by, a similar 
organizational structure, specified in terms of a hierarchically organized 
cognitive neurobiological mechanism. I conclude chapter 3 by surveying 
how cognitive neurobiologists explain, model, and investigate 
mechanisms. This will set the context for interpreting the discussion of 
Russell Barkley’s Executive Function (EF) model of ADHD in chapter 4. 
1.4: Overview of Chapter 4 
 
Chapter 4 brings us to the central question of this study: whether 
ADHD is “real” in the sense that the symptoms associated with that 
category are causally sustained by similar cognitive neurobiological 
structure. I will consider this question through Russell Barkley’s EF- 
model of ADHD, but I first begin with a brief presentation of the DSM 
classification of ADHD. I then consider an objection against the DSM 
categories that poses a particular problem for my project. 
This argument has been made in many different ways, but 
following Kathryn Tabb, we can refer to it as the problem of diagnostic 
discrimination (Tabb 2015). According to Tabb, diagnostic discrimination 
refers to an assumption on the part of psychiatric researchers that the DSM 
categories groups individuals together in such a way that enables the 
discovery of facts about causal mechanisms. She goes on to argue that 




this assumption is most assuredly false. This poses a problem for my 
argument because it relies on the cognitive neurobiological literature on 
ADHD, all of which relies on the DSM categories to select populations of 
individuals to study. While I am sympathetic to this general line of 
critique, I believe the objection’s force is limited by a few considerations. 
First, the DSM categories are a varied bunch, and so whether any single 
one can function as a useful target of scientific research is probably better 
decided on a case-by-case basis. Perhaps as our understanding of the 
mechanisms underwriting mental disorders increases, a future psychiatry 
will cut the pie up differently than we would on the basis of our present 
(and no doubt) imperfect understanding. But that doesn’t mean there is 
nothing to be learned from the epistemic circumstances we are now in. 
That said, with respect to ADHD, I argue that three lines of 
evidence make it prima facie reasonable to treat it a suitable object of 
scientific inquiry. First, the disorder is highly familial, if not highly 
heritable. Second, factor analysis and other statistical measures 
consistently show that the two symptom dimensions in ADHD – 
inattention and hyperactivity-impulsivity – are separate, yet highly 
correlated in individuals diagnosed with the disorder (Willcutt, et al. 
2012). Third, the symptom complex manifested in ADHD can be reliably 




Defiant Disorder (Taylor and Sonuga-Barke 2008). While by no means 
sufficient to conclude that ADHD is an HPC-kind, this serves as 
defeasible evidence warrant moving forward. 
Russell Barkley’s EF-model of ADHD is a highly influential 
account of the disorder. As such, it has been extensively studied and 
provides a useful vehicle for navigating the already voluminous research 
literature on ADHD. According Barkley, ADHD is primarily due to a 
prefrontally mediated, maturational delay in the behavioral inhibition 
system, which in turn causes a suite of cognitive and behavioral problems 
in the executive system. After specifying the basic outlines of the EF- 
model in more detail, I show how it satisfied many of the properties of a 
mechanistic model, which we discussed in chapter 3. I then go on to assess 
its plausibility as a general explanation for all (or most) of the individuals 
diagnosed with ADHD. After surveying various parts of the research 
literature that are supportive of the view, I conclude that a subset ADHD 
individuals maybe fairly characterized as implementing the mechanism 
described by the EF-model, or something near enough. However, the EF- 
model fails to describe majority of individuals with ADHD, which 
suggests that the present DSM classification of the disorder does not 
correspond to a single natural kind, not even in the flexible sense specified 




provides compelling evidence to suggest the presence of alternative 
mechanism underwriting the symptoms associated with ADHD. Broadly 
speaking, this deficit implicates the reward and motivational systems. 
Although there are competing models of the motivational components 
involved in ADHD, will focus on Edmund Sonuga-Barke’s Delay 
Aversion (DAv) model. There is good evidence to suggest the presence of 
another mechanism involved in the production of ADHD and, so, evidence 
to suggest the presence of a distinct HPC-kind: one implicating the 
executive-inhibitory systems, the other the reward-motivational system. 
The narrow conclusion from this study is that the DSM 
classification of ADHD is not a natural kind. However, that provides no 
comfort to the irrealist. The extension of ADHD isn’t empty; it’s not like 
phlogiston. A more apt comparison is between ADHD and, say, 
declarative and procedural memory (Craver 2002; Squire 2009), or 
sensory and affective pain processing (Hardcastle 1999). In each of these 
cases, investigators began with the assumption that the extension of the 
category picked out a single natural kind, only to later find out that the 
antecedent taxon classified distinct kinds together. Insofar as these - albeit 
still imperfectly understood - capacities are considered to be real 









I begin this chapter with a discussion of realism about mental 
disorders, the purpose of which is to get a rough idea of the sense in which 
mental disorders are claimed to be real (or unreal). I then discuss the 
primary vehicle through which philosophers have adjudicated that issue, 
which I call the definitional debate about disease. I will briefly describe 
the historical circumstances surrounding the definitional debate, which 
will go some way towards explaining why the case for realism is thought 
to hinge on providing an analysis of notions such as disorder, function, 
dysfunction, and so on. I then outline three main positions in the 
definitional debate: simple naturalism, two-stage views, and simple 
normativism. Along the way, I demonstrate how the sense of realism I lay 
out in the next section animates these debates. After surveying the 
definitional debate and describing how it operates in the literature, I 
conclude this chapter by showing how the case for realism within the 
definitional debate is tied to deriving a non-evaluative definition of the 
function-–dysfunction distinction. I will argue that the realist need not 
worry about whether that issue can be resolved, which should suffice to 
motivate another way of arguing for mental disorder realism. I take steps 




2.1: Realism: Mind-Independence 
 
For some category (or concept, or item, etc.) x, mind-independence 
is a perfectly natural way of understanding the assertion “x is real” – i.e. x 
is not just an idea in our minds, but exists independently of our ideas. That 
said, two intuitively plausible interpretations of mind-independence settle 
the issue of mental disorder realism in a rather trivial fashion. Let us begin 
with a simple statement of it as an ontological thesis: x is real if its 
existence does not depend on minds. Since we are talking about mental 
disorders here, one can see how this rough and ready formulation is 
inadequate. Whatever the precise relationship between the two consists of, 
mental disorders would seem to depend on minds in that there can be no 
mental disorders if there are no minds to be disordered (Samuels 2009). 
Another reading of mind-independence is causal independence: x is real if 
it is not causally sustained by the existence of minds (Page 2006). A great 
many things are causally sustained (in part) by our mental activity – 
climate change, border collies, artifacts (Samuels 2009, Magnus 2012). So 
too are psychological states. Again, the causal reading of mind- 
independence settles the matter trivially. 
As we will see, the relevant sense of “mind-independence” in 
debates about mental disorder realism is what George Graham calls “act- 




like a comprehensive definition, the notion is intuitive enough: AC- 
independence requires that, for some condition x, x is a real if there is a 
positive body of fact about it that exists independently of our labeling 
conventions. Graham illustrates the idea by contrasting Father's Day and 
molecules. Father’s Day is AC-dependent on us. There is nothing outside 
of our social conventions that makes claims about Father’s Day (e.g. 
Father’s Day is on the third Sunday of June) true or false. Molecules, by 
contrast, are not dependent on our conventions in this way. There is a 
positive body of fact about molecules that are independent of anybody’s 
labeling conventions, which in turn can render statements about them true 
or false. So molecules are AC-independent (Graham 2014, 126). As we 
will see, questions about the reality of mental disorders usually turn on 
precisely this issue. That is, when we wonder if a mental disorder is real, 
we ask if there is anything in the world aside from our labeling practices 
that answers to the label “mental disorder.” 
2.2: Definitional Debate: Historical Background 
 
In the early 1970’s, the main professional body of psychiatrists in 
the United States, the American Psychiatric Association (APA), 
commenced preparations for drafting the third and forthcoming edition of 
its officially recognized nosology, the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual 




1973, with the purpose of crafting a definition of disorder for inclusion in 
the DSM-III. It’s certainly not unheard of for working scientists to quibble 
about how to define the boundaries of their domain. But why the APA 
decided to officially sanction the enterprise is curious. The story of post- 
war psychiatry in the United States was, by disciplinary considerations 
anyway, one of unequivocal success. Fueled by NIMH-funded training 
grants, the APA’s membership roles grew from 5,000 to 27,000 between 
1948 and 1976 (Hale, 1998, 246).
2 
More to the point, neither of the two 
previous editions of the DSM contained a definition of disorder. What 
explains the decision to include a definition for DSM-III? 
As has been amply documented, the APA’s decision was a reaction 
to a converging series of crises that collectively threatened to undermine 
its legitimacy as a medical discipline (Bayer 1981, Shorter 1997, Cooper 
2005, Decker 2013). One source was a change in the nature of social 
circumstances during the 1960’s, whereby old patterns of authority and 
deference increasingly came under question (Shorter 1997, Grob 2011). 
Institutional psychiatry was not exempted from this upheaval. In this 
climate emerged a loose-nit group of intellectuals that has subsequently 





Grant funding grew from $4.25 to $111 million between 1948 




(Foucault), sociologists (Conrad, Scheff, Goffman), lawyers guilds 
(ABA), scientologists (Citizens Commission on Human Rights), and even 
psychiatrists (Szasz, Laing) the anti-psychiatrists are only a “movement” 
in the most generous sense (Grob 2011). Nevertheless, one finds many 
thematic similarities in their various critiques. A reoccurring allegation, 
expressed in different ways, is that disorder attributions were merely a 
covert means to control “deviant” behavior. 
These wider social forces set the conditions for a very specific 
internal controversy that eventually prompted the APA to set out on the 
definitional endeavor. Between 1970 and 1972, the APA and various 
regional psychiatric organizations faced continual pressure from the gay 
rights activists to remove homosexuality from the DSM-II. The APA 
eventually agreed to consider the issue at their national convention in 
1973. One party to these debates was Robert Spitzer, who would go on to 
chair the drafting committee for DSM-III (Bayer 1981). Out of the 1973 
discussions, a faction of psychiatrists – mainly those who favored deleting 
homosexuality from the DSM - recognized the need for a general 
definition of disorder (Decker 2013). This would, in effect, justify the 
decision to de-medicalize homosexuality, but also provide a framework for 
revising the DSM-III. These were the immediate circumstances that led  




the results of these discussions in a volume titled Critical Issues in 
Psychiatric Diagnosis, edited by Spitzer and colleague Donald Klein 
(1978). 
In the intervening years between 1973 and 1978, philosophers of 
medicine took note of these public controversies. In 1975 and 1976, 
Christopher Boorse published two papers, On the Distinction Between 
Health and Illness and What a Theory of Mental Health Should Be. The 
first paper argued that ‘health’ and ‘disease’ were well-entrenched 
theoretical (i.e. descriptive) concepts in physiological medicine that had no 
larger normative implications (1975). The second paper argued that    
while psychiatry had not yet assimilated these concepts into practice, there 
was no in-principle reason why it could not do so once it developed a 
mature theory of function and dysfunction for psychological phenomena 
(Boorse 1976). Also in 1975, philosopher Tristram Engelhardt published 
The Concepts of Health and Disease that, among other things, argued that 
all attributions of disorder were essentially value-laden (1975). These 
papers clearly had an impact on the APA’s deliberations; both Boorse and 
Engelhardt’s works are cited throughout Critical Issues (Aucouturier and 
Demazeux 2014). Interestingly, an essay by Spitzer and Jean Endicott 
detail how the definition task force moved from the narrow objective of 




definition for all medical disorders (Spitzer and Endicott 1978). In effect, 
this definition would subsume psychiatric and somatic conditions under a 
single concept, thereby fending off the anti-psychiatry movement’s 
critique and justifying psychiatry’s place among the medical sciences 
(Wakefield 2007). After the publication of DSM-III in 1980, psychiatry’s 
political position stabilized, and the issue of defining medical disorders 
became less pressing (Cooper 2005, 41-42). However, in the philosophy 
of psychiatry – and more generally, the philosophy of medicine – the 
search for a suitable definition of disorder, both mental and somatic, 
persisted. It is this long-running argument that I call the definitional 
debate. 
2.2: The Definitional Debate: Three Positions 
 
The definitional debate concerns our concepts of health and 
disease -- i.e. what we mean when we employ these terms. Dominic 
Murphy provides a useful taxonomy of the main orientations under which 
most of the positions fall: simple naturalism, simple normativism
3
, and 
hybrid views (2006). 






What I call “simple normativism” Murphy calls “simple 
constructionism.” My label hews more closely to the terminology within 




phenomena of nature. It holds that the concept of disease is value free and 
thus, classification of a condition as a disorder is solely an empirical 
matter. While the term “simple naturalism” might suggest realism about 
mental illness, a curious fact about this position is that the only people 
who ever held it were anti-psychiatrists. Take, for example, Thomas 
Szasz, who was a central figure in the anti-psychiatry movement. Szasz 
was a realist about somatic conditions, but an irrealist about mental 
disorders. Many of his arguments appealed to an alleged difference 
between the sorts of considerations guiding our attributions of physical 
and mental illness, respectively. The former, Szasz argued, are guided by 
medical theory, which contains a value-free conception of normal and 
abnormal functioning. Attributions of mental illness, by contrast, were 
guided by social norms rather than any theory of normal function or 
dysfunction. Elselijn Kingma (2013) reconstructs Szasz’s reasoning from 
his influential The Myth of Mental Illness (1962): 
P1: What constitutes a disorder is a dysfunction or lesion at 
the structural, cellular, or molecular level. 
P2: “Mental disorders” present without such a physical 
lesion. 
C: Mental disorders do not exist. (Kingma 2013, 365) 
 
Szasz’s claim is not that the behaviors associated with mental 
disorders do not exist. Rather, it’s that psychiatry doesn’t employ a non- 




as mental disorders. This argument fits comfortably within the AC- 
independent template for realism (although Szasz doesn’t put it in these 
terms). For Szasz, the only thing sustaining the category of psychiatric 
disorders is our social conventions.
4
 
Hybrid views, or ‘two-stage’ models of disease (Murphy 2006), 
 
are easily the most popular approach among philosophers and medical 
practitioners; even the DSM at one time presumed a version of it (Cooper 
2005). Two-stage models distinguish between a dysfunction and a 
disorder. A necessary condition for a condition to count as a disorder is the 
presence of a dysfunctional mechanism – specified either physically or 
functionally – within the patient. Like simple naturalists, two-stage 
theorists hold that a dysfunction is an objective, AC-independent 
theoretical concept, and that determining the presence or absence of a 
dysfunction is straightforwardly (at least in principle) a task for medical 
science. Where two-stage theorists depart form simple naturalism is with 




One might think that Szasz would be open to the idea that some 
future theory of psychological function would alleviate this concern. But 
Szasz seems to have been a kind of dualist about mentation and a 
structuralist about functions. That is, he seems to have believed that minds 
were non-physical stuff and that functional analysis could only be given 
for physical stuff. Whatever the merits of this position, I think it safe to 
assume that Szasz did not pay very careful attention to philosophical views 





disorder. Two-stage theorists deny that the mere presence of a dysfunction 
is sufficient for a condition to count as a disorder. A further normative 
judgment is required, to the effect that the particular dysfunction is  
harmful (Wakefield 1992), or a ‘bad thing to have’ (Cooper 2005). In this 
way, the two-stage model tries to balance scientific descriptions of biology 
with normative considerations of harm (Murphy 2006). 
There are two main versions of the hybrid view: Christopher 
Boorse’s
5 
biostatistical theory (BST), Jerome Wakefield’s harmful 
dysfunction analysis (HDA). It is important to note a difference between 
these two accounts with respect to what they’re trying to explain. For 
Boorse, the explanatory target is medical theory. The BST purports to give 
a rational reconstruction (an explication) of how concepts like ‘health’, 





Boorse (2014) explicitly rejects the two-stage label, which was 
originally proposed by Dominic Murphy. Murphy wrote that Boorse was 
committed to the “two-stage picture of the foundations of psychiatry,” 
(2006, 19), which holds that our disorder judgments are a hybrid concept, 
one part factual the other evaluative. Narrowly speaking, Boorse is 
correct. Boorse holds that at the foundations of medical science – 
including, presumably, psychiatry – is constituted by his theory of 
function and dysfunction, which is value free. However, Boorse does 
distinguish between various “disease-plus” concepts in medicine, which 
are hybrid concepts consisting of both fact and evaluative components. 
These concepts guide clinical practice, including judgments about when 





1975 and 1976 papers, Boorse says very little about mental disorders, 
preferring to keep his focus on somatic conditions. Wakefield, by contrast, 
is almost exclusively concerned with psychiatric disorders, although he 
thinks his view applies to both mental and physical conditions. However, 
unlike Boorse, Wakefield’s explanatory target is our folk concept of 
disorder. He appears to believe that disorder judgments are guided by a 
universal – perhaps innate – hybrid concept, with one component 
consisting of harm and the other of dysfunction (Wakefield 2010, 276). 
Wakefield’s account of the function-dysfunction theory looks not to 
medical theory, but to evolutionary theory. These differences aside, the 
success of the BST and HDA accounts as realist positions regarding the 
nature of mental disorders depends on whether they can successfully 
articulate a non-evaluative theory of function and dysfunction. 
According to the BST, functions and dysfunctions are defined in 
terms of their statistically typical-atypical contribution to an organism’s 
inclusive fitness; the ability to survive and reproduce. An individual is in a 
pathological (i.e. dysfunctional) condition insofar as some internal 
component departs from the statistically normal range of operation relative 
to a reference class, such as the group of all individuals belonging to the 
same age group, sex and race of an individual (Boorse 1977). So, my heart 




relative to people who are like me (in the same reference class as me) in 
the relevant ways. My heart is dysfunctional if it departs from this range, 
thus impeding my prospects for survival and reproduction. 
Jerome Wakefield’s HDA is easily the most popular version of the 
two-stage view, at least among psychiatrists. According to Wakefield, 
evolutionary theory provides the most scientifically rigorous account of 
function and dysfunction. On this view, an item’s function is identified 
with its naturally selected effect. So the function of, say, an eye, is to 
discriminate between light and shade, since that is presumably the reason 
eyes were selected in the first place. A definition of dysfunction 
straightforwardly follows: for some physical or psychological system s, s 
is dysfunctional if and only if s fails to perform the function for it was 
selected (Wakefield 2007). 
To illustrate how the two-stage view is supposed to work in actual 
cases, let us consider Wakefield and sociologist Allan Horwitz’s analysis 
of depression. Wakefield and Horwitz argue that humans possess an 
innate, universal, psychological module that regulates sadness response. 
These modules are usually activated in circumstances of loss, such as the 
death of a loved-one. Depression arises when something goes wrong in the 
loss-response module. There are, of course, many ways this might happen, 




the appropriate environmental input (i.e. when no loss has occurred) 
(Horwitz and Wakefield 2007, 17). 
There is a third version of the two-stage view, which differs from 
Boorse and Wakefield in terms of how its proponents specify the function- 
dysfunction distinction. Proponents of these views rely on a “systematic”, 
or mechanistic, account of function (and dysfunction). Mechanistic 
accounts of functions get their sense from mechanistic functional models 
they employ, a practice deeply rooted in medicine and biology (Bechtel 
and Richardson 2010). Mechanistic approaches model biological systems 
as machines, systems of causally interrelated parts. Modeling a feature of 
the system involves identifying the relevant sub-parts, their properties and 
functions, and how this system conspires to produce the phenomena of 
interest. Mechanistic models make two assumptions about the systems 
they seek to explain. The first says that the system’s behavior is the 
product of a limited set of subordinate functions (decomposition). The 
second identifies sub-functions with the activities of the system’s 
component parts (localization). A mechanistic function, then, just is the 
typical causal contribution a component makes to the overall functioning 
of the system of which it is a part (Bechtel and Richardson 2010, 23-24). 
A dysfunction, on the other hand, is the failure of some component of the 




Wakefield, proponents of this view argue that whether a particular system 
(a human body, or a human cognitive system) conforms to a given model 
is a perfectly objective, empirical issue, open to scientific investigation in 
the usual way. And it is similarly a perfectly objective hypothesis that 
some system of subsystem is failing to function properly, i.e. is 
dysfunctional, according to a given functional model. But again, according 
to this kind of hybrid (two-stage) view, any such dysfunction will count as 
a disorder only if it is judged to be harmful. 
Simple normativism is more difficult to characterize than either 
simple naturalism or two-stage views. As Carel and Cooper note, “All 
[simple normativist] accounts agree that “disease” is a value-laden concept 
and that diseases are essentially bad, but as authors disagree in their 
accounts of what is bad, and what other criteria might be essential for a 
disease, this agreement hides much disagreement,” (2014, 4). 
At least among sociologists, early proponents of simple 
normativism tended to accept that physiological medicine is guided by a 
value-free concept of function and dysfunction, whereas the function- 
dysfunction concept employed in psychiatry is value-laden. For example, 
Erving Goffman, an influential figure in the early anti-psychiatry 
movement, remarks on this difference in his now classic essay, “The 




medicalized because they involve a departure from biological norms of 
functioning– norms, he says, that, “…have no moral or social connotation” 
(1971, 345). Mental disorders, by contrast, involve a departure             
from social, or culturally established norms. Sociologist Thomas Scheff 
accepted a similar distinction. But he was even more explicit that  
Goffman about the purpose of mental disorder concepts. As a category, 
Scheff argued that mental disorders were contrived as a mechanism to 
control deviant behavior (Scheff 1970). 
Fellow sociologist Peter Conrad
6 
echoed Scheff on this score in his 
 
The Discovery of Hyperkinesis: Notes on the Medicalization of Deviance 
(1975). There, Conrad discusses the “relatively recent phenomenon” of 
hyperkinesis, a diagnosis increasingly given to children who exhibit 
patterns of excessive motor activity, short attention spans, and emotional 
lability. Conrad remarked how the medicalization of hyperkinesis provides 
several social benefits to all parties involved, while also strongly implying 
that these benefits are the only reason for medicalizing hyperkinesis: 
Hyperkinesis minimizes parents' guilt by emphasizing "its not their 





In The Discovery of Hyperkinesis, Conrad did not say whether he 
thought a non-value involving analysis of function-dysfunction for 
physical disorders could be had. In a follow-up work co-authored with 
Joseph Schneider, Deviance and Medicalization: From Badness to 
Sickness, he denied that any such distinction for either physical or mental 




management or control of deviance. Medication often makes a 
child less disruptive in the classroom and sometimes aids a child in 
learning. Children often like their "magic pills" which make their 
behavior more socially acceptable and they probably benefit from a 
reduced stigma also. 
[Conrad 1975, 17] 
Peter Sedgwick, an intellectual and activist on the British left 
argued that all disorder attributions are value-laden. In a paper criticizing 
Goffman’s distinction between biological and social norms, Sedgwick 




[The] ‘biological norms’ to which physical medicine appeals and 
the ‘social norms’ which back up psychiatry, dissipates into 
nonsense as soon as we are brought to see that the medical 
enterprise is from its inception value-loaded; it is not simply an 
applied biology, but a biology applied in accordance with the 
dictates of social interest. 
[Sedgwick 1974, 28] 
 
He goes on to argue that disorder attributions follow from a gap 
between the observable state of the person and a social expectation of 
well-being, which likely varies from culture to culture. According to 
Sedgwick, what individuates disorders from other disvalued states (e.g. 
criminality) is that explanation of the state is limited to, “…a relatively 
restricted set of causal factors operating within the boundaries of the 
7 
Goffman was not the only anti-psychiatrist Sedgwick criticized. 
Szasz was also a frequent target of Sedgwick’s ire. In a humorous passage 
from his polemic Psycho Politics, Sedgwick (a lifelong Marxist) dismisses 





individual human being,” (1972, 216). Rachel Cooper, who is no anti- 
psychiatrist, also argues for normativism about disorders. She defines a 
disorder in terms of three individually necessary and jointly sufficient 
conditions: a condition x is a disorder if and only if x is a bad thing to 
have, those afflicted with x are unlucky, and x is potentially medically 
treatable (Cooper 2005, 4). 
These three orientations – simple naturalism, hybrid views, and 
simple normativism – capture most of the positions in the definitional 
debate. In what follows, I consider some of the main elements of the 
debate between these three camps. I’ll begin with a word about the over- 
all structure of the debate. 
2.3: The Definitional Debate as Conceptual Analysis 
 
The definitional debate is straightforwardly a project of conceptual 
analysis. Robert Audi provides a good working definition of this activity: 
“Let us simply construe [conceptual analysis] as an attempt to provide an 
illuminating set of necessary and sufficient conditions for the (correct) 
application of a concept,” (1983, 90). Proposed definitions thereby assume 
the form of ‘x is a disorder if and only if…’ where conditions for x’s 
application are placed after the ellipses. It is worth noting that in these 
debates, the application conditions are almost always relatively simple, 




HDA: x is a disorder if and only if x is a result of an evolutionary 
dysfunction and x is judged harmful. Rachel Cooper’s purely normative 
account exemplifies a similar structure: x is a disorder if and only if x is a 
bad thing to have, x is such that the afflicted person is unlucky, and x is 
potentially medically treatable (Cooper 2005, 22). Objections to candidate 
definitions are adduced by devising a counterexample, undermining either 
their necessity or sufficiency. 
For instance, necessity objections to simple naturalism and the 
two-stage view point to a number of widely accepted medical conditions 
(e.g. hypertension, appendicitis) that do not straightforwardly result from a 
dysfunctional mechanism (Murphy and Woolfolk 2000, Cooper 2005). 
Simple normativism suffers from worries about sufficiency, since not all 
disvalued states – states we think of as ‘bad things to have’- are 
considered medical disorders (e.g. poverty, ugliness, etc.) (Cooper 2005). 
Sedgwick seemed to have been aware of this problem, and proposed to get 
around it by stipulating that a condition is a disorder if and only if we 
disvalue it and its explanation (in whole or in part) is located within the 
individual. But as Wakefield notes, while this rules out some problematic 
cases (e.g. poverty), it doesn’t rule out all of them; for instance, teething 





The exclusive reliance on conceptual analysis has prompted many 
to doubt whether the definitional debate is a useful project to pursue. Maël 
Lemoine, for instance, argues that the definitional debate follows an 
internal sort of logic that makes it incapable of settling its core objective – 
deciding whether our concept of disorder is descriptive or value-laden 
(Lemoine 2013). Other criticisms point to the implicit fact-value 
distinction underlying the definitional debate. These critics question 
whether these two things are neatly separable in actual practice (Douglas 
2009, Aucouturier and Demazeux 2014), and note that what is a value- 
laden classification at one time (e.g. gold is precious metal) may 
eventually result in a non-evaluative classification at a later time (e.g. gold 
is the chemical element AU) (Lemoine 2013). That is, even if values play 
a role in in classifying a condition as a disorder, there maybe further facts 
to discover about it. Thus, whether our initial categorization judgment was 
determined (in whole or part) by some normative criteria, that alone is not 
sufficient to disqualify the category as real. I am sympathetic to these 
critiques, but for our purposes, the most relevant feature of the definitional 
debate is the sub-argument surrounding the notions of function and 
dysfunction, which motivate two-stage views of mental illness. 
2.4: Function and Dysfunction 
 




crucially depend on deriving a non-evaluative definition of function. Both 
Boorse and Wakefield’s distinct versions of function have been subject to 
numerous epicycles of counter-example, reply, and renewed counter- 
example. Dominic Murphy and Robert Woolfolk, for example, criticize 
Wakefield’s reliance on evolutionary function on the grounds that it would 
rule out conditions such as appendicitis (2000). Contra Boorse, Germund 
Hesslow has argued that ‘health’ and ‘disease’ concepts play no significant 
theoretical role in medical theory (1993). An important line of         
critique seeks to show that Boorse’s notion of function and dysfunction 
are not really non-evaluative after all. On Boorse’s view, function and 
dysfunction are relative to a reference class. Many have argued that norms 
are ineliminably involved in selecting the appropriate features of the 
reference class, so Boorse’s view actually smuggles in values through the 
back door (Kingma 2007 and 2014). 
If our interest is in arguing that mental disorders are real and we 
choose to pursue that line of argument through something like the two- 
stage view, or even just within the general terms of the definitional debate, 
then – as a practical matter – the question of AC-independence reduces to 
finding a non-evaluative account of the function-dysfunction distinction. 
But that is a much stronger commitment than is required by realism, 




requires is that the facts about mental disorders don’t ultimately bottom 
out on mere labeling conventions. Perhaps a non-evaluative notion of 
function-dysfunction is to be had, and perhaps many disorders 
(physical/mental) involve a dysfunction. Or perhaps there isn’t any such 
notion; or maybe there is, and some conditions involve dysfunctions while 
others don’t, and we can only decide which to include in our medical 
categories on a case-by-case basis. However this issue shakes out, tying 
mental disorder realism to the project of objectifying the function- 
dysfunction distinction is gratuitous. It is not required for either 
establishing or defending realism about mental disorders. If these 




In this chapter, we articulated the sense in which mental disorders 
may be real in terms of Graham’s notion of AC-independence (act-of- 
classification-independence). We examined the most common way in 
which philosophers have pursued realism about mental disorders: the 
definitional debate about disease. I demonstrated how the project of 
looking for definitions has been intimately tied to the social and political 
circumstances institutional psychiatry found itself in during the 1970s. We 




disorders proceeded largely in terms set by those debates. After showing 
how the definitional debate typically proceeds, we considered a few 
critiques of that enterprise. I concluded by arguing that the mental disorder 
realist need not be constrained by the definitional debate, and suggested 








In chapter 2 I defined realism in terms mind-independence, and 
mind-independence in terms of AC-independence (act-of-classification- 
independence): x is AC-independent if and only if there is some positive 
body of fact about x that holds independently of our classification 
practices. Thus, when x is AC-independent, the reality of x follows from 
there being a positive body of fact about x that exists independently of our 
labeling conventions. I noted that the traditional vehicle for defending 
mental illness realism is the definitional debate. In that context, realists 
attempt to establish the AC-independence of mental illnesses by 
articulating a non-evaluative theory of the function-dysfunction 
distinction. Whether or not such a theory can be had, I argued that nothing 
about AC-independence per se required such a theory. If that argument is 
sound, then we are free to pursue alternative ways of defending realism 
about mental disorders. Here, I will suggest that mental disorders are, or 
might be, understood as natural kinds -- that is, as categories that “exist in 
nature”, independently of our ideas about them. Thus, natural kinds are 
AC-independent categories. Arguably, natural kinds and their causal 
properties are the primary subjects of study within scientific disciplines. 




Chemical kinds include the individual chemical elements (e.g. hydrogen, 
gold, uranium) and molecules (e.g. H2O, benzene, etc.). Biological kinds 
may include specific kinds of cells (e.g. erythrocyte, osteoclast, and 
various specific types of neurons), specific kinds of organs (e.g. hearts, 
livers, lungs), specific kinds of organisms (i.e. species), as well as specific 
cognitive systems and their subsystems (i.e. attention systems, memory 
systems, various sensory systems, etc.). I will argue that mental disorders 
are best understood in terms of natural kinds within cognitive systems. 
In this chapter I survey two ways in which philosophers have 
characterized natural kinds. The first, long associated with traditional 
metaphysics, is essentialism. I interpret contemporary essentialism as a 
commitment to the following four theses: 
1. All natural kinds have essences (i.e. essential properties). 
 
2. Essences are necessary and sufficient for kind membership. 
 
3. A kind’s essential properties are microstructural properties. 
 
4. A kind’s essential properties are intrinsic (never relational). 
 
I then critique essentialism, arguing that it ought to be rejected 
since it commits us to an ontology out of step with most of the natural 
sciences. 
The second approach to natural kinds I will explicate is Richard 




do not know if Boyd’s view is successful as a general theory of natural 
kinds, it is far superior to essentialism in terms of its fidelity to the 
scientific understanding of special science kinds. After briefly outlining 
the view and contrasting it with essentialism, I then provide a more precise 
what an HPC-kind is, relying on the philosophy of neuroscience literature 
to aid in my explication. I argue ADHD qua HPC-kind should be 
understood in terms of a cognitive neurobiological mechanism. After 
specifying what that understanding entails, I then consider how cognitive 
neurobiological mechanisms are explained, investigated, and modeled. My 
purpose here is two fold. In the next chapter, I will show that Russell 
Barkley’s EF-Model of ADHD is a mechanism sketch. So I want to clarify 
what that means in order to provide a framework for interpreting  
Barkley’s EF-Model, as well as how we should interpret the evidence for 
it. 
3.1: The Essentialist Account 
 
The term “natural kind” first entered the philosophical lexicon in 
the 19
th 
century (Venn 1866, 246), but the basic idea reaches back to 
antiquity. Within the western tradition essentialism is the predominant 
way in which philosophers have thought about natural kinds. The core of 
the view holds that each individual possesses a set of properties that make 




metaphysical works (1963, 2016)
8 
constitute the foundation for the 
approach, and for the ensuing millennium and a half, essentialism 
remained tethered to this basic framework. Aristotelianism conceives of 
the world as one populated by composite entities called substances. An 
individual substance – a rock, a dog, a human, etc. – is composed of  
matter and form, the former individuating it numerically from others of the 
same kind, while the latter determines its essential properties.
9 
A 
substance’s essential properties, in turn, determine the kind to which it 
belongs. So, the first essentialist thesis is simply the attribution of an 
essence, a set of kind-determining properties possessed by the members of 
a kind. While the form/matter ontology out of which essentialism is no 
longer a widely held position, the idea that membership to a kind depends 
on an individual possessing a set of essential properties remains. The 
second thesis says that a kind’s essential properties are necessary and 





See especially VII pt. 4 and XII pt. 3 in Metaphysics (2016). 
9 
I am glossing over a particularly knotty interpretive dispute 
concerning how Aristotle and the subsequent Aristotelian tradition 
conceived of the relationship between essences and forms. Loux (1998) 
argues the relationship is one of identity: a substance’s form and its 
essential properties are one and the same thing. Robert Pasnau (2011), on 
the other hand, construes the relationship merelogically: a substance’s 
essence is a composite consisting of form and “common matter”, which 
refers to the general physical features a substance shares with other 




this condition means that for each kind K there is an associated set of 
essential properties {x, y, z} such that any individual i belongs to K if and 
only if i instantiates each of {x, y, z}. As it stands, these first two 
essentialist theses tell us virtually nothing about what a kind’s essential 
properties are like. We can think of the last two essentialist theses as 
filling that gap. 
The third thesis identifies a kind’s essential properties with its 
microphysical, or microstructural, properties.
10 
The use of “micro” in this 
context is, perhaps, misleading since not all instances of this claim refer to 
the microphysical level of reality as understood by physics, although some 
do. For instance, atomic number (the number of protons in each atom) is 
commonly designated as the essence for chemical element kinds; while for 
biological kinds such as a particular species, essentialists favor identifying 
essences with a species-specific genotype. The salient feature of this 
doctrine isn’t the identification of essences with microstructures (at 
whatever physical “level” they reside), but the particular causal- 





Microphysicalism is not, per se, an essentialist doctrine. For 
example, essentialist David Oderberg argues that “real essentialism” does 
not privilege a kind’s microscopic properties over its macroscopic 
properties (Oderberg 2007, 15-16). Oderberg’s position, however, is a 
minority view among essentialists. I will thus retain the traditional 




Microstructural essences are claimed to causally produce a kind’s 
stereotype (Putnam 1975, 169), the observable (i.e. non-essential), macro- 
level properties we naïvely associate with members of the kind before we 
know anything about its essence. To cite a standard example, if water is a 
natural kind, then H2O is plausibly the essence of that substance, and it is 
the micro-physical properties (such as charges) together with the physical 
molecular arrangement of hydrogen and oxygen atoms that causally 
produces water’s macro-level properties, such as transparency and 
liquidity. 
This causal-explanatory take on essentialism became fashionable 
during the 20
th 
century due to Putnam and Kripke’s work on natural kind 
semantics. Neither offered anything like a systematic statement of 
essentialism. Rather, they explicated it with a suite of examples involving 
particular natural kind terms: “lemons” (Putnam 1975, 158-159), “tigers” 
(Kripke 1980, 120-121), “gold” (1980, 123-125) and “water” (1980, 128). 
In a short 1974 paper, J.L. Mackie argued that Locke anticipated the 
Kripke-Putnam approach to kinds (Mackie 1974). And so, it is now 








Mackie and others are right to credit Locke, but it seems to me 




The last of the four essentialist theses says that a kind’s essence is 
solely constituted by intrinsic, rather than extrinsic, properties. David 
Lewis provides a frequently cited example of an intrinsic property, “A 
thing has its intrinsic properties in virtue of the way that thing itself, and 
nothing else, is.” (1983, 111-112) Beyond this, the notion remains the 
subject of a long-standing debate among philosophers. I cannot hope to 
provide a comprehensive survey of the various positions here, so an 
example will have to suffice. Brian Ellis defines an intrinsic property as 
one an object possesses solely in virtue of internal causal forces, 
“Essential [intrinsic] properties distinctive of a natural kind must be 
independent of the histories, locations, and surroundings of its members,” 
(Ellis 2002, 51). 
 
 
the first philosopher to articulate the basic logic of the assumption – that 
of a dependency relationship between a kind’s essential and non-essential 
properties. Rather, Aristotle already did so; and that basic connection 
persisted relatively intact throughout the long scholastic tradition that 
followed in his wake. By the time Locke published the first English 
edition of the Essay in 1689, this causal-explanatory conception of 
essences was, as Robert Pasnau puts it, “…the [absolute] standard 
seventeenth-century notion of what an essence is,” (2011, 658). So, in 
terms of the function essences perform – as causally underwriting the 
characteristic, yet non-necessary properties of a kind – Lockean essences 
were not terribly different from traditional essences. 
Locke’s innovation is the way in which he gave a material 
interpretation to the Aristotelian account of the essential-non-essential 
properties distinction, resituating it within the new corpuscular- 
mechanistic science. Commandeering a bit of Aristotelian terminology, 
Locke even refers to these microstructural properties – which include 




3.2: Critique: Essentialism 
Most contemporary philosophers do not consider essentialism an 
acceptable theory of kind-hood. Due to its rather stringent metaphysical 
commitments, essentialism leads to an ontology bereft of many well- 
motivated scientific categories simply because they do not conform to the 
(largely a priori) strictures of the view. This merits jettisoning the 
essentialism as a viable account of natural kinds. 
Let us consider some example from the special sciences. With respect 
to biological kinds, essentialism results in metaphysical extravagance. As 
Magnus (2012, 34) notes, in developing their own versions of this view 
Wilkerson (1988, 1993, and 1995) and Ellis (2001 and 2002) 
independently arrive at the conclusion that individual organisms must 
constitute distinct natural kinds. This is because Wilkerson and Ellis argue 
that the essence of a species is defined by the total genotype each 
individual organism has, which is ultimately responsible for it having the 
biological properties, dispositions, and behaviors that it has. But since 
there just so happens to be a lot of interspecific genetic variation - that is, 
no two conspecifics (not even monozygotic twins) are genetically identical 
– the result is that each individual genotype constitutes a distinct kind unto 
itself. So, whereas a canine biologist – or, you or me, or any other right- 




members the single kind canis lupus familiaris, Wilkerson and Ellis’s 
accounts classify them as members of two distinct kinds, defined by the 
ineliminably idiosyncratic composition of their respective genomes! This 
bizarre outcome follows straightforwardly from the assumption that 
essences correspond to necessary and sufficient properties and 
microstructural assumption.
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As Wilkerson writes, “The real essence 
which is in part causally responsible for the behavior of the genetically 
unique individual is the essence of the kind of which the unique individual 
is the only member” (Wilkerson 1993, 16; emphasis original). 
The above example suffices to disqualify essentialism as a serious 
doctrine regarding kinds (as appropriate to the special sciences, at least). 
But further problems beset the view. Take the assumption that essences 
must be intrinsic. Ellis stipulates that, “Essential properties distinctive of a 
natural kind must be independent of the histories, locations, and 
surroundings of its members,” (2002, 51). So stated, it is not even clear 
whether this definition can accommodate Ellis’ own flagship example of 





From vantage point of evolutionary theory, this result is wholly 
unsurprising. Essentialism predicts, at least, a set of traits universally 
present in the species and unique to each species. Forces like mutation and 
genetic drift militate against universality, while common ancestry and 





assumption, he also wants to say that a chemical element’s macroscopic 
properties are causally produced by its intrinsic essence. But as Holly 
Vande Wall argues, it is simply not the case that the macroscopic 
properties of chemical substances flow neat and tidily from its intrinsic, 
microstructural properties; to a significant extent, an element’s 
macroscopic properties depend on extrinsic properties as well. Concerning 
the well-worn essentialist example, H2O, Vande Wall writes, “In order to 
behave like water, the H2O molecules and ions must be in contact…here it 
seems that where the molecule is found (in contact with other molecules 
and ions of oxygen and hydrogen and not, for example, isolated in the 
interstices of a crystal structure) is an extrinsic quality,” (Vande Wall 
2007, 51; emphasis original).
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Although Ellis’s analysis of intrinsic properties is but one of many 
on offer, I am doubtful that any of them could ultimately save the 
intrinsicality assumption about kinds. The basic obstacle is this: there are 
just too many clear-cut examples of kinds defined by properties that no 
account of intrinsicality could plausibly capture. Returning to our previous 





Another problem for Ellis’ view is that chemists do not consider 
molecular shape an intrinsic property, but a response property that varies 




and Charlie as conspecifics is that they share an ancestor that diverged 
from wolves about 35,000 years ago (Skoglund, et al. 2015). Presumably, 
no reasonable analysis can sanction shared ancestry as an intrinsic 
property. 
3.3: Homeostatic Property Clusters 
 
Richard Boyd first introduced the HPC-theory as part of a defense 
of moral realism (1988). He argued that many traditional philosophical 
and scientific categories – reference, goodness; species – could be 
fruitfully understood as HPCs. Over time, (1989, 1991, 1999, 2000, 2003, 
2010) he developed the HPC-theory into a full-blown, general view of 
kind-hood. 
Boyd identifies natural kinds with HPCs. An HPC is a cluster of 
contingently associated properties that tend to be reliably co-instantiated 
by its members, or instances, due to a causal mechanism. The qualifier 
“tend” is important here, as it singles out an important difference between 
HPCs and the essentialist approach to kinds. Essentialism holds that for 
each kind, there is a set of properties that all and only members of the kind 
possess. The HPC-theory makes no such demand. The clustering of 
properties associated with the kind is often “imperfect” in that no single 
property need be necessary for kind membership (Boyd 1989, 15). As 




like a duck, and a mute mallard will not quack – but both are nonetheless 
mallards,” (Magnus 2014, 149-150). 
As other philosophers have noted (e.g. Griffiths 1999), the HPC- 
mechanisms seem to perform a role similar to essences (i.e. the essential 
properties involved in essentialist accounts) in that they both are supposed 
to causally produce the stereotypical properties and behaviors associated 
with the kind. Samuels goes so far as to call the HPC-mechanisms “causal 
essences” (Samuels 2009, 56). There are similarities between the 
essentialist and HPC accounts, but they shouldn’t be overstated. First, as 
already mentioned, on the HPC account no property need be strictly 
necessary for membership in a kind. Second, unlike essentialism, the 
HPC-theory imposes no a priori constraints on the types of properties 
(processes, etc.) that may compose the homeostatic mechanism; nor does 
it posit a privileged physical level where such properties have to reside 
(Boyd 1999). The upshot is that a property (or process etc.) earns inclusion 
within the HPC-mechanism if it causally contributes to the stability of the 
cluster – that is, if it makes a causal contribution to the co-instantiation of 
the property cluster associated with the kind. 
This looseness should not be construed as a total lack of 
constraints. Not just any cluster of properties counts as a kind. Some 




sanctioning disjunctive kinds, but that is a mistake. Boyd argues that one 
reason natural kinds are epistemically valuable is due to their role in 
facilitating scientific investigation and inductive inference (Boyd 1999, 
146). The HPC-theory explains why natural kinds can play this role in our 
epistemic practices: the collection of properties associated with a given 
kind reliably cluster as they do for a reason. In the case of a species – at 
least, those that are sexually dimorphic – the primary stability generating 
mechanism of a kind is its spatio-temporally continuous reproductive 
history.
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If a kind were truly disjunctive in having no properties (e.g. no 
morphological, behavioral, historical, etc. properties) in common, the 
corresponding kind-category could function neither as a stable target of 
investigation nor feature into explanations in any reasonable way. 
Boyd proposes that all natural kinds are HPCs, but other 
philosophers are skeptical. One issue concerns the fact that many 
fundamental physical kinds do not seem to have their properties in virtue 
of a causal mechanism (Magnus 2014, Slater 2015). Whether that 
objection is fatal to the HPC-theory as a general account of kinds, or 
merely points out a special limiting case of the notion of kinds, need not 




The full story is probably more complex than this simple sketch. 
There are likely other mechanisms (developmental, environmental) at 




that it does seem to accurately capture a large number of special science 
kinds. In particular, as other philosophers have noted (e.g. Samuels 2009, 
Beebee and Sabbarton-Levy 2010, and Tsou 2013) the HPC-account 
rather nicely accommodates psychological and psychiatric kinds. 
3.4: Psychiatric Kinds as Cognitive Neurobiological Kinds 
 
Boyd provides a lot of interpretive leeway in how we might 
understand how an HPC-kind is “put together” and which properties count 
in establishing the identity of a given HPC. One interpretation holds that 
an HPC is simply a self-sustaining property cluster, whereby causal 
relations between the properties implement the “mechanism” itself. 
Another separates the mechanism and property cluster such that the 
property cluster is sustained distinct causal process. Boyd seems to 
understand species in this way; that is, a species is a collection of 
individuals bearing various physiological, morphological, and behavioral 
similarities to one another and individuals tend to instantiate all (or most) 
of these properties due to causal processes such as the reproductive history 
of the species, gene flow, and so on. 
For mental disorders, I propose to interpret them as HPC-kinds and 




philosophy of neuroscience literature on mechanisms.
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In sum, I assert 
that ADHD is an HPC-kind if members of the kind instantiate the same 
cognitive neurobiological mechanism. To be clear, Boydian 
“mechanisms” and the sense of mechanisms articulated below have 
distinct senses, and ought not be confused. Boydian mechanisms refer to 
the causal processes that keep an HPC in homeostasis. Depending on the 
kind at issue, they may or may not be part of defining an HPC-kind. The 
sense of mechanism I will employ is narrower. Roughly, a mechanism in 
my sense is an organized physical structure instantiated in the nervous 
system and is responsible for producing the set of symptoms associated 
with a given mental disorder. In this restricted sense, the mechanism 
establishes the identity of a mental disorder, defined as an HPC-kind. 
Which is to say, I intend my particular interpretation of mechanism to 
individuate the HPC-kind. 
Before explicating this restricted sense of cognitive 
neurobiological mechanisms, allow me to head off a potential objection to 
this approach. In chapter 2, we discussed mechanistic explanations as a 





This construal of HPCs was first proposed by psychiatrist 
Kenneth Kendler, psychologist-philosopher Peter Zachar, and the 
philosopher of neuroscience Carl Craver (2011). The account I offer here 




justifiably suspect that the proposal to understand psychiatric kinds in 
mechanistic terms just returns us to the argumentative ground of the 
definitional debate. That is, we use mechanistic explanations to ground a 
dysfunction-function distinction, and then argue that mental disorders are 
real since they are sustained by mechanistic dysfunctions. Not so! For, the 
definitional debate takes the function-dysfunction distinction as primary, 
and attempts to define that distinction in a way that is independent of any 
specific disease (or any specific functional mechanism). We are not 
engaging in that project here. Rather, my goal is to address the issue of 
realism for specific mental disorders; namely, ADHD. While the account I 
consider, Barkley’s EF-model, does suppose that ADHD involves a 
dysfunctional mechanism, we can remain agnostic about the mechanism is 
“really” dysfunctional, or whether it is merely different. Establishing a 




Cognitive neuroscience seeks to explain cognition and behavior in 
terms of the organization of the nervous system. For complex cognition – 
e.g. memory, attention, and perception – it assumes, by and large, the 




Another difference between this project and the definitional 
debate is one of scope. Unlike realists in the latter, I have no additional 
commitment to the notion that every mental disorder must involve a 




set of information-processing capacities operating over representations 
(Crastley and Samuels 2013, Sullivan 2015). The primary difference 
between these two disciplines is that cognitive neuroscience marries 
functional analysis to structural analysis (Boone and Piccinini 2015). So, 
to a first approximation, cognitive neuroscience aims to elucidate the 
physical mechanisms underlying the cognitive capacities recognized by 
cognitive psychology. 
As understood here, a mechanism is a hierarchically decomposable 
physical system of causally interacting entities and activities. An entity is  
a component (i.e. part) of the mechanism; an activity is what the entity 
does. A mechanism implements a capacity in virtue of the causally 
organized relations of its components and their activities (Craver 2007, 
Craver and Darden 2013). As Boone and Piccinini note, neurocognitive 
mechanisms exemplify an iterative structure, wherein, “…each component 
of the mechanism is in turn another mechanism whose capacities are 
explained by the organized capacities of its components; and each whole 
mechanism is itself a component part that contributes to the capacities of 
the larger whole,” (2016, 1515; emphasis original). In other words, what 
counts as a single mechanism at one level of organization is, at a more 
detailed level of organization a hierarchical system of nested mechanisms. 




across a number of argumentative contexts and admits different 
interpretations. In mechanistic contexts, levels are understood in terms of 
two notions: composition and organization (Craver 2007, Craver and 
Bechtel 2007). The former expresses a structural fact about mechanisms. 
Namely, mechanisms are composed of part-whole relations between the 
“higher-level” mechanism implementing a capacity and its “lower-level” 
component parts and their activities. We can understand the meaning of 
“organization” by contrasting mechanisms with aggregates (Wimsatt  
1997, Craver 2007). An aggregate is an unorganized collection of 
components whose properties are literally the sum of its component parts 
(e.g. the mass of a heap of sand just is the sum of the mass of its grains) 
(Craver 2009, 395). Mechanisms are more than aggregates because, in the 
first instance, their components must stand in specific causal relations to 
one another in order to implement a capacity. For example, a mere heap of 
cardiomyocytes cannot push blood through the circulatory system; rather, 
they must be suitably organized (e.g. causally, temporally, spatially, etc.) 
in order to do so. In addition, mechanisms – unlike aggregates – possess 
causal powers their components do not. This should not be read as a 
commitment to emergent properties, at least in any significant 
metaphysical sense. It merely expresses an intuition, widely embedded in 




do things none of their parts can do on their own (Craver 2007, 217) – e.g. 
hearts are cardiomyocytes organized in a way that can pump blood, 
whereas no cardiomyocyte can itself pump blood. Kim characterizes this 
feature of macro-micro wholes as “macrocausation” and, similarly, argues 
that it is a metaphysically unproblematic notion: 
This baseball has causal powers that none of its proper parts, in 
particular none of its constituent microparticles have, and in virtue 
of its mass and hardness, the baseball can break a window when it 
strikes it with a certain velocity. The shattering of the class was 
caused by the baseball and certainly not by the individual particles 
composing it. 
[Kim 2005, 56] 
A mechanism will exhibit different degrees of organizational 
complexity depending on the phenomena in exhibits. It is largely assumed 
that the mechanisms underwriting thought and behavior will be quite 
complex; involving multiple levels of organization– i.e. molecular, 
cellular, circuit, network levels. Nothing in this interpretation requires 
complex cognitive mechanisms to be strictly localized in the sense of 
being confined to a relatively well-circumscribed area of neural tissue. As 
physical structures, mechanisms have to be localized somewhere, but 
“somewhere” implies continuum of localizability (Bechtel and Richardson 
2010). For example, the components of the mechanism underwriting long- 
term potentiation across the synapse (a persistent increase in synaptic 




occupying the more strongly localizable end of the continuum; the 
components of neural networks are, by contrast, much more weakly 
localizable and thus, reside at the opposite end of the continuum (Buckner 
2015, 3936). 
We can now state how ADHD understood as an HPC-kind: ADHD 
is an HPC-kind if its symptoms result from, or are sustained by, a similar 
organizational structure, specified in terms of a hierarchically organized 
cognitive neurobiological mechanism. What remains to be determined is 
how we would go about finding out if individuals with ADHD met this 
condition. For that, I know turn to provide a brief account of the nature of 
mechanistic models and their role in the explanation and investigation of 
the workings of cognitive systems. 
3.5: Mechanistic Explanations, Models, and Investigation 
 
Complex cognitive capacities are exhibited in hierarchically 
arranged physical mechanisms. A mechanism exhibits a capacity in virtue 
of the organized collection of its component parts and their activities. A 
mechanistic explanation can be cast in many different representational 
formats, but for the sake of simplicity let us subsume these under the 
broad heading of “mechanistic models.” Mechanistic models lie along a 
continuum in terms of completeness, ranging from sketches, to schemas, 




sketches are incomplete specifications of the explanandum mechanism 
(the mechanism to be explained), usually relying on gaps and filler terms 
for entities and activities that are not yet known (Weiskopf 2011, Craver 
and Darden 2013). Mechanism schemas are abstract specifications of 
mechanisms that can be filled in to yield specific causal processes (Craver 
2007, Craver and Darden 2013). Most models of complex cognitive 
phenomena lie somewhere between sketches and schemas. Nonetheless, 
they are more useful than mere phenomenal models. For, whereas 
phenomenal models merely describe the mechanism’s observable 
behavior, it includes no details of its underlying means of operation, 
whereas mechanism sketches provide constraints on the space of possible 
mechanisms that might be responsible for the phenomena of interest 
(Craver 2007, 228). 
As Craver notes, scientists rarely consider the full space of possible 
mechanisms the outset of any attempt to model a cognitive mechanisms. 
Rather, it is usually constrained by what the researcher                      
already knows about the phenomena at issue (Craver 2007, 247). Although 
not every mechanism implemented by the nervous system spans several 
levels, complex cognitive capacities do, and so pruning this space requires 
information about causal relations between components operation at 




number of experimental protocols for determining whether a putative 
component
17 
causally contributes to the operation of the mechanism. 
(Craver 2007, 198)
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I’ll mention two, but both comprise variations on a 
single theme: intervene on the variable of interest, and track the (resulting) 
changes elsewhere in the system. This can proceed in either a bottom up or 
top-down fashion. Lesion studies and gene knock-out experiments are 
bottom-up interlevel experiments, where some lower-level component is 
manipulated to see whether that produces a change in the behavior of the 
whole. Top-down experiments look at the behavior of the components in 
order to determine if they are active during the mechanism’s operation. 
Examples include task-based functional magnetic resonance imaging 
(fMRI) studies: a subject performs a task believed to tap the relevant 
cognitive capacity while changes in blood-flow or oxygenation are tracked 







The use of the term “component” is intended widely, to include 
both “small” items (e.g. cells) and “big” items (e.g. circuits) as well as 
their activities. 
18 
Stated formally: for (a) system S, (b) capacity y-ing exhibited by 
S, (c) putative component x and sub-capacity f-ing, causal relevance can 
be shown if and only if (i) x is contained within S, (ii) some ideal 
interventions on the x's f-ing changes the phenomenon S's y-ing, and 
(iii) some ideal interventions on S's y-ing changes x's f-ing. This is 
sufficient to establish that x is a component in the causal mechanism. 




implemented with different measuring apparatuses, including single and 
multi-cell recordings (Craver and Darden 2013, 125-128). 
Mechanistic investigations proceed in an iterative fashion across 
multiple levels of organization, where each field uses its own specialized 
experimental techniques and models. The picture is one of relative, but not 
total autonomy among fields. The overall goal is to identify mechanisms 
for a particular capacity by shrinking the space of possible mechanisms. 
At minimum, this involves determining roughly where the mechanism’s 
boundaries lie, and what kinds of components causally contribute to its 
operation. The best, and perhaps, only way to accomplish that is through 
the coordination of models across different organizational levels (Craver 
2007). 
To sum up, complex cognitive capacities are implemented by 
hierarchically arranged physical structures. Mechanist models explain 
these capacities to the extent that they can articulate how the organized 
activity of the structure’s components produce the phenomena of interest. 
Models vary according to the level of detail they include. But most models 
of complex cognitive capacities lie somewhere between sketches and 
schemas. Nonetheless, whatever their degree of completeness, each 
mechanistic model of complex cognitive capacities is designed to 




Moreover, all such models are evaluable by the same set of evidential 
criteria, namely, the degree to which they accounts for observable 
behaviors and physical processes. 
Although only a partial guide to the functioning of a mechanism, 
mechanism sketches often contain enough organizational structure to 
endorse realism with regard to a particular mental disorder. The mental 
disorder realist faces no special problem here. Most models of complex 
cognitive mechanisms are likely to be mere sketches of a complex 
underlying physical process. Unless one is a dogmatic irrealist about the 
mind, the evidential support for mechanism sketches should provide good 
reason to believe that the systems and components they model are real 
features of human cognitive systems. 
3.6: Conclusion 
 
I have argued for the rejection of essentialism about natural kinds. 
My arguments against both appealed to scientific practice. I argued that 
essentialism commits us to an ontology out of step with the scientific 
worldview and is thus, not a suitable philosophical view of natural kinds. I 
presented an alternative account, Boyd’s HPC-theory, and argued that its 
flexibility made it a superior view to essentialism. I then provided a more 
precise interpretation of HPC-kinds, relying on the philosophy of 




HPC-kind if set of symptoms associated with the disorder is causally 
sustained by a similar organizational structure across instances, specified 
in terms of a hierarchically organized cognitive neurobiological 
mechanism. I then specified how cognitive neurobiologists constructed 
their models, distinguished between mechanism sketches and schema, and 
further showed how models are tested in order to make sense of my 








In this chapter I address the primary question of this dissertation: is 
ADHD an HPC-kind and thus, by the dictates of AC-independence, is it 
real? I will pursue that question through Russell Barkley’s Executive 
Function (EF) model of ADHD. If Barkley’s model is more or less right – 
that is, if (some or all) of individuals diagnosed with ADHD instantiate the 
mechanism specified by the EF model - then ADHD does indeed count as 
a real. In section 4.3, I provide brief survey of the EF-model, its 
components, and the way in which accounts for ADHD behavior, I will 
show that Barkley clearly intends that the EF-model to be a mechanistic 
model of ADHD. So, we may evaluate it as we would any mechanistic 
model. I will then assess a few distinct lines of evidence in its favor. I 
argue that while the mechanism described by the EF-model (or some very 
similar model) is most likely instantiated in a subset of individuals with 
ADHD, not all individuals with ADHD have an EF deficit. There is 
compelling evidence to suggest the presence of an alternative mechanism 
that produces a class of the symptoms associated with ADHD. I will 
survey one of them, Edmund Sonuga-Barke’s Delay Aversion (DAv) 
model. I conclude that ADHD, as classified by the DSM, fails to be natural 




pick out a single natural kind, the DSM classification of ADHD 
corresponds to several distinct natural kinds. Thus, ADHD earns its status 
as real insofar as it picks out distinct cognitive neurobiological 
mechanisms (i.e. natural kinds). 
Before I address these questions however, I begin with the DSM 
classification of ADHD. Along the way I will address the argument that, 
due to its operational and descriptive approach to classification, the 
categories identified by the DSM are terminally unsuitable for research 
into their underlying mechanisms. If sound, this argument would seem to 
rule out any possibility of assessing whether ADHD is, or might be, an 
HPC-kind. I will show that this criticism, at least with respect to ADHD, 
can be met, and that it is prima facie reasonable to treat the DSM category 
for ADHD as a suitable object of scientific study. 
4.2: ADHD and the DSM-5 
 
The DSM-5 classifies ADHD in the superordinate category 
“Neurodevelopmental Disorders” (APA 2013). This tacit acknowledgment 
of the role played by neurobiology in the disorder represents a slight 
departure from previous DSM classifications of ADHD, which were 
entirely atheoretical and acausal in their characterization. Nevertheless, we 
shouldn’t overstate the difference between the DSM-5’s classification of 




still contains no specific information about etiology or neuropathology, 
and the disorder and symptoms are still exclusively described in terms of 
observable behavior. 
ADHD is characterized as, “A persistent pattern of inattention 
and/or hyperactivity-impulsivity that interferes with functioning or 
development” (APA 2013, 59). The manual distinguishes between three 
“presentations” of the disorder: ADHD-PI (predominately inattentive), 
ADHD-PH (predominately hyperactive-impulsive), and ADHD-C 
(combined presentation) (APA 2013, 60). This tripartite division was 
originally introduced in DSM-IV, although that edition called them 
“subtypes” (APA 1994, 80). Subsequent longitudinal studies showed these 
distinctions were essentially nominal. The subtypes did not show 
significant differences in treatment, course, or outcome and, moreover, 
they were temporally unstable. This is primarily because hyperactive 
behavior tends to remit in late-adolescence, so a young child diagnosed 
with ADHD-C might later qualify for an ADHD-I diagnosis as an adult 
(Willcutt et al. 2012). The DSM-5 language of clinical “presentations” is 
intended to signal this fluidity (DuPaul and Stoner 2014). 
For children 16 and younger, a diagnosis of ADHD-PI, ADHD- 




• The presence of six of nine symptoms in the inattentive (ADHD- 
PI) or hyperactive-impulsive domain (ADHD-PH) or both 
(ADHD-C) 
• The symptoms must have persisted longer than six months 





There are three further criteria an individual must meet for a 
diagnosis. First, the symptoms must cause impairment in at least two 
settings (e.g. social, academic, or occupational). Second, there must be 
evidence that “several” of the symptoms were present and impairing 
before age 12. Third, the symptoms must not exclusively occur during the 
onset of schizophrenia or some other disorder, and must not be better 
explained by another mental disorder (APA 2012, 60). 
4.3: ADHD, the DSM and Diagnostic Discrimination 
 
Psychiatric researchers use the DSM criteria to select groups of 
individuals to study, so it plays a crucial role in the scientific investigation 
into the causal underpinnings of mental disorders. But the DSM’s 
classification criteria are also subject to an enormous amount of criticism. 
Here I consider an objection that poses a particular problem for the 
argument I pursue here. The objection has been spelled out in many 




The DSM-5 is the first edition of the manual to include age- 
specific symptom thresholds (five out of six) and descriptions for adults 




operational, and descriptive-atheoretical approach to classification renders 
its categories terminally unsuitable as a guide to scientific research 
(Poland and Van Eckardt 2013). 
Kathryn Tabb provides a reasonably clear statement of this 
critique. Tabb argues that psychiatrists err in assuming that the DSM 
categories will facilitate diagnostic discrimination. That is, psychiatrists 
who use the DSM assume its categories lump patients together in such a 
way as to, “…allow for relevant facts about mental disorder to be 
discovered.” (Tabb 2015, 1047-1048) For the present case (ADHD), the 
“relevant facts” are those pertaining to the mechanisms underlying the 
symptoms. Tabb then provides a sustained argument that the DSM does 
not group patient populations in a way that facilitates successful 
investigation into the underlying causal mechanisms of their disorders. 
Although I have no desire to mount a defense of the DSM, I 
believe the force of this criticism is limited. The individual conditions 
classified by the DSM are clearly a varied bunch, so as a general critique, 
this argument may cut against some DSM categories more than others. 
Harold Kincaid argues that it is better think of the DSM categories as 
potentially exemplifying “heterogeneous validity” (Kincaid 2017, 279), 
whereby some categories might pick out reasonably homogenous groups 




might not. The larger point is that if we want to know whether a DSM 
category can support fruitful scientific research – that is, research into 
underlying mechanisms – then thinking about the issue in the abstract is 
probably not the best way to answer that question. Rather, we need to look 
at individual conditions and make that assessment on a case-by-case basis. 
With respect to ADHD, there are several reasons that prima facie 
suggest it is a suitable category for research into underlying mechanisms. 
First, ADHD type behaviors are highly familial, if not highly heritable. 
Family studies consistently demonstrate that parents and siblings of 
children with ADHD have a two to eight-fold increase of qualifying for 
the disorder (Faraone and Biederman 2014, 52849). A meta-analysis of 
twin studies from populations in the United States, Scandinavia, Australia, 
and the European Union yielded a heritability estimate of 76%, which 
suggests a strong genetic contribution to the ADHD phenotype. Adoption 
studies further support the inference of a genetic contribution, since 
biological relatives of ADHD children are found to have the condition at a 
higher rate than adoptive relatives of ADHD children; the risk of ADHD 
in adoptive relatives is similar to what one would find an a non-ADHD 
control group (Faraone et al. 2005). Second, factor analysis and other 
statistical measures consistently show that the two symptom dimensions in 




highly correlated in individuals diagnosed with the disorder (Roberts et al. 
2015). In other words, the symptom pattern in ADHD individuals 
consistently “hangs together.” Third, the symptom complex manifested in 
ADHD can be reliably differentiated from other closely related disorders, 
such as Oppositional Defiant Disorder (Taylor and Sonuga-Barke 2008). 
While none of evidence just cited is sufficient to show that the 
DSM classification of ADHD is an HPC-kind, it is sufficient to 
demonstrate that the DSM category picks out a reasonably consistent 
population of individuals -- i.e. a stable object for further investigation. 
Whether or not that population will be homogenous in terms of some 
further underlying mechanisms remains to be seen. But it is clearly not the 
case that the DSM classification of ADHD has nothing going with respect 
to diagnostic discrimination. Its classification systematically corresponds 
to several interesting patterns, and that is enough to justify its use for 
research, whatever limitations the DSM’s operational and descriptive 
approach to classification may have more generally. 
4.4: The Executive Function Model of ADHD 
 
In the following discussion I assess whether the DSM 
classification of ADHD identifies an HPC-kind. I’ve previously clarified 
the notion of an HPC-kind in cognitive neurobiological terms. To recap, 




category are sufficiently similar with respect to their underlying cognitive 
neurobiological structure and function, as captured by an appropriate 
mechanistic model (or mechanism sketch). Given the DSM’s atheoretical 
stance, we can only pursue this question by engaging the research 
literature on causal models of ADHD. This is not a simple, straightforward 
proposition, given the volume of scientific papers about ADHD.
20 
So, I 
will focus on one fairly well-studied model of ADHD, Barkley’s executive 
function (EF) model. My selection of the EF-model is pragmatic; it’s not 
the only model of ADHD, nor it is the newest. But Barkley’s model is  
very important in the history of ADHD research, since it organized a large 
body of descriptive data about the disorder and linked it to a well-founded 
neuropsychological construct: EF. Thus, it attracted an enormous amount 
of research attention, and therefore provides us with a convenient means of 







One bibliometric study estimated that between 1980 and 2005, 
over 5,000 scientific papers have been published about ADHD (López- 
Muñoz, et al. 2008). 
21 
Barkley thinks that the DSM classification of ADHD picks out 
two distinct (disorders). Specifically, he thinks ADHD-PI is a separate 
disorder, which he calls Concentration Deficit Disorder (CDC) (Barkley 
2014). Though not as thoroughly researched as ADHD, the extant data 
tentatively indicates that individuals with ADHD-PI (or CDC) suffer from 
a different pattern of impairments than individuals with ADHD-C or 
ADHD-PH (Becker et al., 2014). I will not pursue the question of whether 
CDC constitutes a distinct natural kind. I mention it to note that the EF- 




How to precisely define EF remains an ongoing controversy in the 
neuropsychological literature, but it is standardly assumed to be comprised 
a set of top-down, cognitive supervisory processes involved in abstract 
thought, planning, goal-directed behavior (Carlson, Zelazo, and Faja 
2013).
22 
I begin with a short summary of how the EF-model attempts to 
explain ADHD. 
On the EF-model, ADHD is primarily a deficit in behavioral 
inhibition, which produces secondary deficits in executive functioning. 
The dysregulated interaction between the inhibitory and executive 
systems, in turn, produces a myriad of cognitive and behavioral deficits 
observed in ADHD individuals. Barkley argues that the behavioral and 
executive systems are implemented in the prefrontal-striatal network. 
Barkley identifies four components of the executive system 
compromised in ADHD: spatial working memory, verbal working 
memory, reconstitution, and the self-regulation of affect. While slightly 
different in the details, Barkley’s model of working memory is essentially 
the same as Alan Baddeley’s influential neuropsychological model. 
 
 
constitute the vast majority of individuals diagnosed with ADHD (Nigg 
2006, 9). 
22 
Barkley’s model purports to be a general model of EF, although 
a precise definition of EF remains controversial in the neuropsychological 
literature. I mention this controversy only to point out that even if the 
particular facets of Barkley’s EF-model are not exactly right, the overall 




Baddeley’s model splits working memory into a central executive and two 
subsidiary components: the phonological and visuospatial 
storage/rehearsal subsystems. The phonological system is responsible for 
the temporary storage of verbal information, while the visuospatial system 
stores spatial representations. The central executive is responsible for 
selective attention, manipulation and retrieval of task-relevant information 
from long-term memory (Baddeley 2012). The phonological loop 
corresponds to Barkley’s spatial working memory; the visuospatial system 
corresponds to nonverbal working memory; and the central executive 
corresponds to reconstitution (as best I can tell). Reconstitution, according 
to Barkley, operates on the contents of spatial/verbal working memory by 
decomposing and reassembling its contents into novel representations 
and/or behavioral sequences. 
Self-regulation of affect involves two processes. First, it involves 
the regulation of emotional responses – both the subjective experience 
(e.g. anger) and any associated motor behavior (e.g. brow-furrowing when 
angry). Secondly, it involves the capacity to modulate one’s arousal level 
in the service of goal-directed behavior, especially in the absence of 
external rewards (Barkley 1997). 
Barkley argues that ADHD individuals exhibit deficits in most, if 




the foundational deficit is a maturational delay in the brain’s behavioral- 
inhibitory capacities. This system is causally necessary for the operation 
Executive Functions (Barkley 1997, 51). This inhibitory system is 
composed of three interrelated processes: halting a prepotent response, 
interruption of ongoing response, and interference control. Halting a 
prepotent response is the most important component. Barkley defines it as 
the capacity to arrest a learned behavioral pattern in the presence of a 
stimulus with which positive or negative reinforcement is associated. 
Interrupting an ongoing response refers to the capacity to halt a particular 
motor sequence in response to environmental feedback. Both of these 
processes create a temporary period of delay between environmental input 
and motor output, during which time executive processing can occur. 
Interference control is the capacity to protect the delay period created by 
latter two functions from either competing motor responses or task- 
irrelevant stimuli (Barkley 1997). 
Let’s now frame the EF-model in terms of the HPC-theory of 
natural kinds (as I’ve interpreted it). The EF-model says that the 
symptoms associated with ADHD are sustained by a particular cognitive 
neurobiological mechanism, located roughly in the prefrontal-striatal 
network. This mechanism, or better yet, network of mechanisms, may be 




behavioral inhibition system and executive system. In order to operate 
efficiently, the executive system causally depends on the inhibitory system 
to regulate automatic behavioral responses to incoming stimuli. The EF- 
model maintains that the development of the behavioral-regulatory system 
is delayed in individuals with ADHD. Since the inhibitory and executive 
systems involve several different components that are differentially related 
to one another, the EF-model obviously admits various patterns of 
interaction between them. For instance, failure to screen out task- 
irrelevant stimuli (interference control) allows too much information to 
seep into working memory, thereby overloading its limited storage 
capacity, resulting in reduced working memory performance (see 
Illustration 1). The pattern of interaction between the two systems is the 
mechanism that individuates ADHD as an HPC-kind. The ensuing suite of 
cognitive deficits – poor working memory, poor regulation of affect and so 
on – constitute the property cluster sustained by the mechanism. 
Consistent with the HPC-theory, it need not be case that every individual 
with ADHD instantiates every possible pattern or every possible cognitive 
deficit. However, if ADHD is an HPC-kind, then we should expect to find 
that most individuals diagnosed with the disorder implement a good deal 






Illustration 1: Barkley’s EF-Model of ADHD. From ADHD and the 
Nature of Self-Control, by Russell A. Barkley, (New York: Guilford Press, 
1997). Reprinted with permission from the Guildford Press. 
 
 
4.5: Evaluating the EF-Model as a Mechanism Sketch 
 
The EF-model constrains the space of possible mechanisms in 
ADHD by bridging together information about the disorder from several 
different levels of organization. Barkley is quite explicit that any 
respectable model of ADHD must do this. After reviewing various lines of 
evidence – genetic, biological, and neuropsychological factors detected in 
ADHD individual – Barkley reflects on what a model of ADHD requires. 
He writes, “To meet these constraints, a model of ADHD must bridge the 




functions of the prefrontal lobes and related structures—the executive 
functions), and developmental psychology (as it pertains to the normal 
development of the behavioral or psychological traits mediated by these 
brain structures,” (Barkley 1997, 45; emphasis mine). 
Thus, the EF-model specifies a mechanism sketch for the 
underlying cause of ADHD behaviors. It provides the following features: 
(a) the computational processes likely to be responsible for the production 
of ADHD type behavior (i.e. the interaction between inhibitory and 
executive systems), (b) the regions of the brain implementing that 
mechanism (i.e. prefrontal-striatal network), and (c) a developmental 
processes responsible for the mechanism’s operation (i.e. maturational 
delay in the behavioral inhibition system). The advantage of interpreting 
the EF-model as a mechanism sketch is that we can evaluate it 
empirically, just as we would any other mechanism sketch. 
Although the EF-model of ADHD draws on a general theory of 
EF, our argument for ADHD realism need not be concerned with whether, 
strictly speaking, that particular general model of EF is precisely right. 
For, EF is widely recognized as a well-founded neuropsychological 
system. A number of alternative models of EF have been proposed, but all 
make use of similar types of components and processes (e.g. working 




whether all (or most) of the individuals diagnosed with ADHD exemplify 
the same, or similar, type of cognitive neurobiological mechanism. With 
that in mind, I now turn to consider evidence in favor of Barkley’s and 
similar models. 
Neuroimaging studies consistently implicate the right hemisphere, 
including many components of the prefrontal system, in ADHD 
individuals. ADHD children show about a 3-5% reduction in right 
hemispheric volume (Hynd, et al. 1990, Castellanos, et al. 1994, 1996, and 
2001; Filipek, et al. 1997; Seidman, Valera, and Makris 2005) and about a 
12% volumetric reduction in four regions – the prefrontal cortices, basal 
ganglia/striatum, cerebellum, and corpus callosum – strongly associated 
with complex, goal-driven behavior (Nigg and Nikolas 2008, 311). On the 
assumption that structural differences imply functional differences, these 









Evidence from structural neuroimaging research strongly 
suggests that such structural differences do imply functional differences. 
The most robust evidences derives from sensory discrimination tasks. The 
size of the olfactory bulb, for example, positively co-varies with the ability 
to discriminate between smells. And although not as well understood, this 
positive correlation holds for other higher-order cognitive capacities as 
well, including memory and executive functioning. This is of course not to 
say that “bigger is better” tout court. These findings only hold within a 
particular range of volumetric values. Once a particular section of neural 





specific support for the EF-model derives from neuropsychiatry. As it 
stands, there is well-replicated evidence for three neuropsychological 
deficits posited by the EF-model: inhibitory control, interference control, 
and working memory. Much of this data derives from task-based 
functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI), which comprises the 
largest pool of imaging research on ADHD (Cortese and Castellanos 2015, 
47). Task-based fMRI experiments are a type of top-down, activation 
experiment, which we discussed in the previous chapter. In these studies, a 
subject performs a task believed to tap the relevant EF while situated in an 
fMRI machine. For the sake of illustration, I’ll mention one example. The 
go/no-go test is a widely accepted measure of the capacity to inhibit a 
prepotent response. While there are several different experimental designs 
of the go/no-go test, one common variant presents the subject with a 
randomly alternating sequence of two stimuli, X and Y, with instructions 
to press a button (‘go’) when X appears on the screen and to withhold that 
response (‘no-go’) when presented with Y. Typically, researchers first 
prime the subject with a long sequence of X’s (go-stimuli) in order to 
establish a prepotent response. Inhibitory capacity is calculated by the 
number of erroneous responses to no-go stimuli; that is, the number of 




On average, ADHD individuals perform more poorly on this and 
another neuropsychological measure of interference control (e.g. Nigg 
2001; Lansbergen, Kenemans, and van Engeland 2007); and the fMRI data 
consistently implicates both abnormal patterns of activation (e.g. 
hypoactivation) and structural abnormalities in the prefrontal and 
associated regions (Hard, Radua, and Nakao 2013). Moreover, 
hypofunctioning is likely the causative factor for failed inhibitory control 
and these abnormalities appear to be largely genetic in origin.
24 
As for 
working memory, ADHD individuals consistently test as impaired for all 
three components, with the largest deficits residing in the central 
executive, a smaller deficit in the visuospatial system, and a still smaller 
deficit in the phonological component (Martinussen, et al. 2005; Alderson 
et al. 2007; Rapport, et al. 2008). 
Lastly, recent work supports the claim that ADHD involves a 
maturational delay, and that this delay is strongly associated with 




Evidence for this observation derives from task-based studies 
examining adolescence with ADHD, their unaffected siblings, and 
typically developing controls. In these studies, ADHD kids and their 
siblings show similar patterns of under-activation in the frontal-striatal and 
frontal-parietal regions relative to controls. But, in instances of no-go 
responses – where behavioral inhibition is tapped - unaffected siblings do 
better than their affected siblings and show intermediate levels of 





cortical development in ADHD children and non-ADHD children. In 
typically developing controls, Shaw and colleagues found that the brain 
reaches peak cortical thickness at age 7, and 50% peak cortical surface area 
at age 12. By comparison, the study showed that children with ADHD do 
not hit these developmental benchmarks until 10 and 14, respectively     
and that the most prominent site of delay resides in the lateral prefrontal 
cortex (2012). The same team examined cortical development in adults 
diagnosed with ADHD as children. They found that the number of ADHD 
symptoms present in adults co-varied with cortical thickness. Specifically, 
the developmental trajectory of adults whose symptoms had largely 
remitted converged with that of typically developing controls, while adults 
with persistent symptoms showed fixed, non-progressive deficits in 
cortical thickness (Shaw et al. 2013). 
4.6: ADHD: Multiple Deficits and Multiple Kinds 
 
Let us take stock. So far, we’ve considered evidence broadly 
sympathetic to the EF-model. At the neurobiological level, ADHD is 
robustly correlated with structural-functional abnormalities in the 
prefrontal region of the brain. These areas are all associated with 
inhibitory and interference control, and working memory. ADHD 
individuals consistently do worse on neuropsychological tests designed to 




maturational lag in cortical development of these regions and that this lag 
co-varies with symptom severity. 
Minimally, it is reasonable to conclude the DSM classification of 
ADHD picks out at least one HPC and so, one natural kind. To reiterate, I 
define an HPC as a cognitive neurobiological mechanism and a mental 
disorder is an HPC-kind insofar as the symptoms associated with it are 
sustained by a particular kind of mechanism. In terms of the HPC-theory, 
the mechanism is composed of the maturational delay and the  
dysregulated interaction of the inhibitory and executive systems, and the 
suite of cognitive deficits are the property clusters sustained by the causal 
interaction between the two. These conspire to cause the various behaviors 
indicative of ADHD: inattentiveness, hyperactivity, and impulsiveness. 
Thus, the DSM classification of ADHD corresponds to at least one HPC- 
kind. However, it is further question whether the DSM classification picks 
out only individuals with executive deficits. On this score, the evidence 
strongly suggests it does not. 
The first set of considerations derives from an important 2005 
meta-analysis conducted by Willcutt and colleagues, which examined over 
3,734 ADHD children across 13 measures of executive functioning 
(Willcutt et al. 2005). On a group level, the study found a significant 




However, as Willcutt et al. further note, this association is weaker than 
what one would expect if the EF-model, qua single deficit causal model, 
were true. In the ADHD group, effects size for executive functioning were 
in the moderate range (d= 0.60–0.80), which is equivalent to 50% overlap 
with the control group. Another paper by the same group examined pooled 
results of EF measures from three ADHD research centers (267 ADHD 
individuals vs. 600 controls). They found that while 80% of ADHD 
children were impaired in at least one domain of EF, only 53% show 
impairment in two EF domains, and only 31% in three (Nigg, et al. 2005). 
These findings indicate that only a minority individuals diagnosed 
with ADHD are executively impaired. But all, or most, of these 
individuals presumably exemplify the symptoms associated with ADHD, 
so the further question is whether there is evidence for alternative 
mechanisms sustaining these behaviors? If so, then that would constitute 
positive evidence for the presence of distinct HPC-kinds within the DSM 
classification of ADHD. I now argue there is such evidence for distinct, 
non-EF related HPC-kinds within the ADHD population. 
First, ADHD individuals consistently show deficits in relatively 
independent, non-EF neuropsychological domains. These include: arousal 
and activation (Fair, et al. 2012), temporal processing, (Toblak, 




Mueller 2012), auditory processing (Cheung and Siu 2009) and fine motor 
control (Fliers, et al. 2009). Second, neuroimaging data shows functional 
and structural deviations that clearly exceed the EF-model’s 
characterization of ADHD as a prefrontal syndrome. For a useful 
summary of this literature, including regions associated with both EF and 
non-EF, see Illustration 2. 
 
 
Illustration 2: Reprinted by permission from Macmillan Publishers Ltd: 






A) Cortical regions, linked to working memory (dorsolateral 
prefrontal cortex), planning and complex decision making (ventromedial 
prefrontal cortex), and orientation of attention (parietal cortex). B) 
Affective components of EF, C) Planning, initiating motor response 
(dopaminergic system) and modulation of arousal (noradrenergic system), 
D) Working memory, cognitive control, flexible adaptation, inhibition. E) 
Reward network. F) Alerting network; supports attentional functioning. G) 




Specific evidence for a distinct HPC-kind derives from research 
into the motivational systems of ADHD individuals. Individuals with 
ADHD commonly exhibit a preference pattern for smaller, immediate 
rewards over larger, delayed rewards. This has led many researchers to 
posit a motivational impairment involved in the production of ADHD-type 
behaviors.
26 
Edmund Sonuga-Barke argues that this preference pattern is a 
behavioral manifestation of a motivational style called “delay aversion” 
(DAv) (2005). Sonuga-Barke’s model is very sophisticated, but the gist of 
it is that DAv is the product of two interacting processes. The first is a 
biologically based deficit in reward signaling, specifically a higher than 
average temporal discounting of rewards delivered after delay. 
Neurologically, this deficit implicates the mesolimbic reward pathway. 
The second is environmental. Children with this impairment are more 
likely to come into conflict – censure, reproach, etc. - with their 
caregivers, since delaying gratification is a skill that most children are 
expected to acquire as they grow older. The negative input from the 
 
 
when (D) activates in typically developing controls. ADHD individuals 
show distinctive patterns of desynchronization between the posterior 
cingulate cortex and medial prefrontal cortex. 
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In the 1990’s, motivational models were pitched as competitor 
accounts to the EF-model. For a comprehensive review of these, see: 




environment conspires with the biologically based impairment in temporal 
signaling to create DAv. Sonuga-Barke reasons that many of the 
symptoms associated with ADHD are a behavioral expression of the DAv. 
Of course, the most obvious manifestation is just a consistent preference 
for short-term, smaller gains over long-term, larger, rewards, but Sonuga- 
Barke considers other possibilities. For instance, in circumstances when 
delay is unavoidable (e.g. a classroom), a child might engage in fidgety 
behavior as an effort to create non-temporal stimulation so as to reduce the 
experience of delay (Sonuga-Barke 2005). 
In broad outline, several lines of research support the DAv-model. 
 
Preference for immediate rewards can reliably differentiate individuals 
with ADHD from typically developing controls on two measures of delay 
tasks, the Maudsley Index of Delay Aversion and The Choice Delay Task 
(Sonuga-Barke, et al. 2008). Delay aversion and executive dysfunction 
have both been found individuals with ADHD, but appear to be unrelated 
dimensions; that is, they affect different subsets of ADHD individuals 
(Solanto, et al. 2001) Attentional bias toward delay-related cues in the 
environment (Sonuga-Barke, et al. 2004) and higher levels of frustration 
when unexpected delays are imposed (Wilbertz, et al. 2013) have both 
been frequently documented in ADHD individuals. Imaging studies 




system in response to delayed reward in ADHD individuals (Ströhle, et al. 
2008, Plichta, et al. 2009). Worthy of mention here is a landmark study by 
Nora Volkow and colleagues, which imaged the mesolimbic dopamine 
pathway in a sample of 53 medication-naïve ADHD adults and 44 healthy 
controls over the course of eight years. Compared to controls, ADHD 
individuals show a significant reduction in the number of dopamine 
receptors in the midbrain and accumbens
27 
(Volkow, et al. 2009). Given 
 
dopamine’s well-known role in the production and maintenance of 
motivational salience (Bromberg-Martin, Matsumoto, and Hikosaka  
2010), this is compelling physiological evidence, if not specifically for 
DAv, then at least for a non-EF mechanism underwriting ADHD. That is, 
the evidence indicates spatially distinct mechanisms (i.e. located in other 
regions besides the prefrontal cortex) that, in turn, implement 
computationally distinct cognitive processes (i.e. non-EF). Thus, this 
evidence supports the existence of at least two distinct natural kinds within 
the DSM category. One broadly involves an executive deficit, implicating 
the prefrontal region of the brain; the other involves a motivational deficit, 












It is of course possible that a single process will eventually explain 
all of the various impairments, and structural and functional abnormalities 
associated with ADHD. But most researchers deem it unlikely. Sonuga- 
Barke succinctly summarizes the present consensus in the field: 
Given the complexity of the picture and obvious causal 
heterogeneity in ADHD, researchers need to study the relation 
among cognitive, energetic, motivational, and executive processes 
in ADHD. The most likely scenario is that there is not one single 
core deficit that explains the condition – ADHD is not a single 
pathophysiological entity. More likely, ADHD is made up of 
different groups of patients with their own distinctive etiologies 
and pathophysiologies. 
[Sonuga-Barke 2013, 561; emphasis mine] 
 
Over the course of the last fifteen years or so, research has shifted 
away from models emphasizing a single core deficit that explains all of the 
symptoms associated with ADHD, to multiple-deficit models. Sonuga- 
Barke’s work was an early example of this trend. His “dual-pathway” 
model conjoined his DAv model with an executive function model, and 
proposed that each represented two dissociable deficits, either of which 
could result in an ADHD diagnosis
28
; other researchers carve up the 






Sonuga-Barke has since abandoned the dual-pathway model for 





It is impossible to say in advance what the final verdict of these 
investigations will be. But, the evidence to date is sufficiently robust that 
we can answer the primary question of this study: is ADHD a natural kind? 
The answer is no. But that provides no succor to the irrealist. ADHD        
is not like phlogiston; its extension isn’t empty. It fails to be a natural kind 
in the sense of being a single HPC, but the totality of evidence strongly 
indicates it is several HPCs, with at least one involving the inhibitory- 
executive systems and another involving the motivational-reward systems. 
According to the realist strategy pursued here, ADHD thus fairly earns its 








In chapter 2 I examined the controversies surrounding the “reality” 
of mental illness. We cashed out those arguments in terms of mind- 
independence, and we cashed out mind-independence in terms of act-of- 
classification (AC) independence. Framed this way, realists hold that there 
is a positive body of fact about mental disorders (aside from our value 
judgments) that can be discovered and studied. In other words, the 
category of mental disorder is not exhausted merely by our value 
judgments. We then examined the primary way in which realists have 
sought to establish AC-independence about mental illness: the definitional 
debate. 
Realists in the definitional debate do not deny the role of value 
judgments in guiding our decisions to medicalize certain conditions. 
However, they assert that a necessary condition for any category to count 
as a legitimate medical condition is that it must be produced by an 
objectively defined dysfunction. Thus, in the context of the definitional 
debate, establishing AC-independence qua mental disorders reduces to 
establishing AC-independence qua a theory of function and dysfunction. I 




requires, which in turn opens up alternative avenues to the realist for 
pursuing their case. One such way, which is my preferred approach, is 
establishing that mental disorders are natural kinds. 
In chapter 3, we examined two alternative approaches to natural 
kinds: essentialism, and Richard Boyd’s homeostatic property cluster 
(HPC) account. I argued that essentialism is a non-starter, since it results 
in a taxonomy radically at odds with the natural sciences, broadly 
construed. I discussed why the HPC-account is better, although its 
prospects as a general theory of kind-hood remain to be seen. I then 
proposed to interpret ADHD as an HPC-kind. I further precisified the 
view by consulting the philosophy of neuroscience literature on 
mechanisms. I argued that the DSM classification of ADHD is an HPC- 
kind provided that it corresponded to a common cognitive neurobiological 
mechanism within all individuals that have ADHD. 
I pursued this approach in chapter 4, primarily through an 
explication of Russell Barkley’s Executive Function Model (EF) of 
ADHD. Barkley’s model argues that the symptoms of ADHD are caused 
by the dysregulated interaction between the brain’s inhibitory and 
executive systems, which is ultimately due to a prefrontally mediated 
developmental delay in the former. I surveyed the evidence from the 




the EF-model’s claims. Specifically, ADHD individuals: a) show 
widespread structural and functional abnormalities in the prefrontal 
regions, b) consistently show deficits in inhibitory control, interference 
control, and verbal and non-verbal working memory, and c) ADHD 
individuals show a maturational lag in cortical thickness the right 
prefrontal regions. Furthermore, these developmental trajectories co- 
varied with symptom expression. I argued that this evidence constituted a 
reasonable basis to conclude that the DSM classification of ADHD 
corresponded to at least one HPC-kind. I further considered whether the 
EF-model accounts for all (or nearly all) of individual cases of ADHD, 
and argued that it does not. There is compelling evidence for the presence 
of alternative cognitive neurobiological mechanisms in some individuals 
with the condition. And, on the HPC-account of natural kinds, differences 
in mechanism imply a difference in kind. Therefore, the evidence shows 
that there are alternative HPC-kinds of ADHD disorders. Thus, I 
concluded that ADHD is a real disorder -- indeed it is several real 
disorders -- in that there are AC-independent facts about it, facts that are 
independent of anyone’s value judgments. 
Reflections 
As Rick Mayes and his colleagues aptly remarked, “Attention 




most extensively studied pediatric mental disorder and one of the most 
controversial…” (Mayes et al. 2009, 1). Like other scientific objects (e.g. 
climate change, vaccines) most of the controversy about its reality is 
largely located outside of disciplines tasked with studying it. Among the 
vast majority of medical professionals, ADHD’s reality – at least in broad 
outline – is a settled question. There does persist a vocal and, to be frank, 
slightly blinkered minority that refuses to engage in any meaningful way 
with the vast body of evidence underwriting this consensus. Nonetheless, 
like global warming skeptics, ADHD skeptics have a knack for keeping 
the controversy alive in the public mind. In one way or another, these 
arguments try to undermine the scientific understanding of ADHD, 
primarily as a means to abolish it as a medical category. To these critics, I 
suggest that an honest reckoning with the scientific evidence would 
actually suit, rather than hinder, their purposes. For, even after the reality 
question is settled – and to be clear, for ADHD I believe it is settled – it 
remains an open issue as to whether we ought to medicalize it. I think 
there is a reasonable case for doing so. Individuals with ADHD are at risk 
for a whole range of undesirable life outcomes, but it is unclear whether 
these are sufficient to justify its medicalization. Thus, unlike questions 
about its reality, questions about its medicalization are not yet foreclosed. 




we ought to care for individuals with ADHD. These people are worth 
caring about to be sure, but whether that care should be primarily medical 
is still a reasonable question to debate. 
The primary conclusion of this dissertation sits somewhat 
ambiguously within the larger debates about the DSM in the philosophy of 
psychiatry. In one sense, it vindicates the standard criticism that the 
DSM’s approach to classification is likely to yield heterogeneous 
categories. On the other hand, it is also true that our understanding of the 
disorder has grown exponentially over the last 30 years, which seems to 
cut against some of the more extreme forms of skepticism about the 
scientific prospects of the DSM categories. After all, nearly everything we 
now know about ADHD is in one way or another filtered through the 
DSM. This is not to say that the DSM classification of ADHD hasn’t 
hindered research in some ways. It surely has. But it does suggest caution 
about endorsing global assessments of the DSM’s suitability as a useful 
tool for research. 
In making the case for realism about ADHD, I have consulted only 
a subset of the research literature about the disorder. Barkley’s EF-model 
and Sonuga-Barke’s dual-pathway model belong to the larger class of 
neuropsychological models of ADHD, including Sergeant’s Cognitive- 




transfer deficit model, and Sagvolden et al.’s Dynamic Developmental 
Theory (2005). These models may be thought of as the “first-wave” of 
causal theorizing about ADHD, as they were developed in tandem with the 
revolution in brain imaging technology that occurred during the 1990s. 
These first-wave models attempted to parsimoniously explain the suite of 
deficits and behaviors observed in ADHD individuals in terms of a set of 
primary deficits (Faraone and Biederman 2014). It is unclear whether this 
level of analysis will ultimately prove viable as our understanding of the 
etiology of ADHD increases. 
At the neurological level, the emerging picture is that ADHD 
individuals exhibit widespread patterns of atypical structural and 
functional connectivity all over the brain. In individuals without ADHD, 
the general trajectory of brain development proceeds towards more 
focalized patterns of functional connectivity over time. ADHD individuals 
by contrast, tend to exemplify much more diffuse patterns of connectivity. 
For example, in tests of executive functioning, ADHD individuals activate 
a much more distributed set of structures than their typically developing 
counterparts, which produces a much more inefficient solution to the kinds 
of problems posed by these instruments (Faraone and Biederman 2014). 
The upshot is that many researchers are beginning to conceptualize ADHD 
 




associated with the condition – as the final product of an extended process 
of atypical neurological development. Once these developmental 
mechanisms are better understood, the resultant taxonomy might be 
different than a taxonomy constructed solely on the basis of the 
synchronic state of the nervous system, which is essentially what these 
first-wave models do. This doesn’t render the argument offered in chapter 
4 erroneous per se; ADHD individuals do embody, to a rough 
approximation, the deficits described in the EF and dual-pathway models. 
It only shows that further investigation might lead us to revise the first- 
wave models in such a way as to better account for the experimental 
evidence. At any rate, if there is future philosophical work to be done on 
ADHD along the lines of this dissertation, a good place to start is with 
trying to get a better understanding of the implications of this emerging 
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